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Note 
 
Stranger than Science Fiction: The Rise of A.I. 
Interrogation in the Dawn of Autonomous Robots 
and the Need for an Additional Protocol to the 
U.N. Convention Against Torture 
Amanda McAllister* 
Amidst a bloody civil war, a group of rebel insurgents have 
stolen critical information regarding the infrastructure of the 
government’s head military base; their intent is to identify 
structural weaknesses and coordinate a massive attack that 
will result in hundreds of thousands of casualties. The com-
mander of the military manages to identify a member of the in-
surgent group while she is posing as a diplomat on a consular 
assistance mission. He takes her into custody and accuses her 
of treason. Desperate to prevent the impending attack, he in-
terrogates her while she is being tortured in an attempt to ob-
tain critical information on the insurgent group’s activities.1 
But there is one catch: the diplomat is Princess Leia, the 
commander, Darth Vader. And the torturer? An autonomous 
droid.2 
 
*  J.D. Candidate 2017, University of Minnesota Law School. I am espe-
cially thankful to Professor Fionnuala Ní Aoláin for her thought-provoking 
questions and invaluable guidance while drafting this Note. I also want to ex-
tend my gratitude to Jason Crider, Griffin Ferry, Mandi Janikowski, Megan 
Manion, and Hannah Nelson for their insights and feedback. Finally, a heart-
felt thank you to my husband, Tyler, for his endless encouragement and love. 
Copyright © 2017 by Amanda McAllister. 
 1. Such an act is a violation of international human rights, international 
humanitarian law, and customary international law. The Legal Prohibition 
Against Torture, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Mar. 11, 2003), https://www.hrw.org/ 
news/2003/03/11/legal-prohibition-against-torture#laws (explaining that tor-
ture is a violation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the United 
Nations Convention Against Torture, international humanitarian law, and has 
become a jus cogens (non-derogable) norm and, as such, a violation of custom-
ary international law). 
 2. STAR WARS: EPISODE IV – A NEW HOPE (Lucasfilm 1977). The interro-
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Who then is responsible for the actions of the robot, and 
consequently, the human rights violation? Is the system merely 
applying preprogrammed actions or making autonomous deci-
sions? How does that implicate the responsibility of its design-
ers or operators?3 If the robot is autonomous, would it bear re-
sponsibility? Can an individual be held liable for the 
autonomous decisions of a non-human something else? 
While such a nightmarish scenario may seem to belong in a 
galaxy far, far away, the interrogative dimensions of the tor-
ture Star Wars depicted might not be so distant after all. Many 
predict the rise of autonomous weapons systems to be on the 
horizon, with robotics technology positioned as the next Revolu-
tion in Military Affairs (RMA).4 Indeed, drones and other lim-
ited autonomous robots are already operating on the battlefield, 
and countries with their eyes set on autonomous systems are 
spending billions on their development.5 Artificial intelligence 
 
gator droid is designed for torture and deliberately frightening in appearance, 
armed with syringes, flesh peelers, and bone fragmenters. SIMON BEECROFT, 
STAR WARS CHARACTER ENCYCLOPEDIA 94 (2011). It is “completely without 
pity.” Id. For a broader discussion about threat of torture, see Gäfgen v. Ger-
many, 2010 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 16, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-99015 
(“Legal qualification of threats of torture.”); GARY D. SOLIS, THE LAW OF 
ARMED CONFLICT: INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW IN WAR 437–85 (2010) 
(discussing how the laws around threat of torture are unsettled). 
 3. The Ethics of Autonomous Weapons Systems, U. PA. L. SCH., https:// 
www.law.upenn.edu/institutes/cerl/conferences/ethicsofweapons (last visited 
May 12, 2017). 
 4. Ronald Arkin, Lethal Autonomous Systems and the Plight of the Non-
combatant, 137 AISB Q. 4, 4 (2013); see also Chantal Grut, The Challenge of 
Autonomous Lethal Robotics to International Humanitarian Law, 18 J. CON-
FLICT & SECURITY L. 5, 6–7 (2013) (“[W]hile autonomous killer robots might 
sound like science fiction, they are much closer to reality than is often appre-
ciated. See for example the drones capable of navigating their own flight 
paths, developed or being developed by Northrop Gunman [sic], Carnegie 
Mellon and MIT amongst others; the commissioning of research by the US Air 
Force into software which would allow drones to land and take-off autono-
mously; and ‘swarming’ drones, which by definition operate and move together 
autonomously.”); Geoff Dyer, U.S. Military: Robot Wars, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 7, 
2016), https://www.ft.com/content/849666f6-cbf2-11e5-a8ef-ea66e967dd44 
(“For the Pentagon leadership, innovations like [autonomous drones] are cen-
terpieces of a new wave of military technology that officials hope will keep the 
US ahead of China and Russia, whose heavy investments in recent years has 
[sic] closed the gap.”). 
 5. Losing Humanity: The Case Against Killer Robots, HUM. RTS. WATCH 
(Nov. 19, 2012), https://www.hrw.org/report/2012/11/19/losing-humanity/case 
-against-killer-robots (“[T]he US Department of Defense has spent approxi-
mately $6 billion annually on the research and development, procurement, op-
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has become increasingly adept at reading human emotional re-
sponses, making robot-enhanced interrogation capable of 
measuring physiological reactions related to truth-telling a real 
possibility.6 Yet, “while robot interrogators offer time, cost, and 
effectiveness benefits, they also risk undermining fundamental 
rights.”7 
Internationally, there have been growing calls for bans or 
an international convention on autonomous robotic weapons.8 
The past three years, state parties have convened and debated 
such a ban at the United Nations (UN) Convention on Certain 
Conventional Weapons.9 Yet, no legislation, treaty, or norms 
currently exist to address the unprecedented threat posed by 
autonomous robots to torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrad-
ing treatment prohibitions. 
 
erations, and maintenance of unmanned systems for war, and that figure is 
likely to increase rapidly.”); Mary Wareham, Killer Robots: Why the World 
Should Ban Autonomous Weapons Systems, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Nov. 28, 2014), 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/11/28/killer-robots-why-world-should-ban 
-autonomous-weapons-systems (“[S]everal precursors [of autonomous weap-
ons] . . . are in development in the United States, China, Israel, Russia, South 
Korea, the United Kingdom, and other nations with high-tech militaries 
demonstrat[ing] the trend toward ever-increasing autonomy on land, in the 
air, and on or under the water.”). 
 6. Kristen Thomasen, Examining the Constitutionality of Robot-
Enhanced Interrogation, in ROBOT LAW 306, 315–16 (Ryan Calo et al. eds., 
2016). 
 7. Id. at 329. 
 8. Matthew Bolton, Debating Proposals for a Possible International Con-
vention on Robotic Weapons, INT’L COMM. FOR ROBOT ARMS CONTROL (Oct. 3, 
2012), http://icrac.net/2012/10/debating-proposals-on-a-possible-international 
-convention-on-robotic-weapons. 
 9. In early 2015, the UN held a Convention on Certain Conventional 
Weapons (CCW) to debate a ban on lethal autonomous weapons systems. Cur-
rently, the United States delegation to the CCW has been noncommittal on a 
ban and United States policy permits the Department of Defense to pursue 
such a development. Steven Groves, U.N. Conference Debating a Ban on Au-
tonomous Weapons: Understanding Key Issues, HERITAGE (Apr. 16, 2015), 
http://www.heritage.org/defense/report/un-conference-debating-ban 
-autonomous-weapons-understanding-key-issues. A U.S. Department of De-
fense Directive in 2012 required that, for now, human beings remain “in the 
loop” when decisions involving lethal force are made. See infra note 38. The 
directive contains significant loopholes, such as a waiver by high-level de-
partment officials and expiration without renewal in 2022. Bonnie Docherty, 
U.S. Takes First Step on Fully Autonomous Weapons, but Stricter Controls 
Needed, HUM. RTS. @HARVARD L. BLOG (Apr. 16, 2013), http://hrp.law.harvard 
.edu/staff/u-s-takes-first-step-on-fully-autonomous-weapons-but-more-needed. 
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Many have accused the laws of armed conflict of being 
backwards-looking and “one war behind” in its regulation of 
battle spaces.10 Similarly, international human rights law runs 
the risk of being “one technological revolution” behind if it fails 
to foresee and prevent the widening gap for potential human 
rights violations likely to exist in a more fully realized autono-
mous future. Further, the dawn of autonomous warfare is not 
just any technological revolution; it is a paradigm shift and 
qualitatively different than anything of the past.11 Therefore, it 
is “imperative that courts, state agencies, legislators, and de-
signers consider and address the potential implications of this 
technology before it is widely deployed.”12 
While some have called for a total ban on the development 
of autonomous systems,13 many consider that to be an unsus-
tainable or impractical solution.14 As such, neglecting to criti-
cally analyze crevices in coverage in the language of interna-
tional law will allow for rhetorical circumvention based on hazy 
understandings of robots’ growing autonomy. This in turn will 
risk impunity for grave human rights violations. Our own cur-
rent visions of technology and the language we have ascribed to 
them are not static. An inevitable reformulation of linguistic 
approaches post-technological revolution risks rendering the 
language of the foremost treaty on torture and cruel, inhuman 
and degrading treatment prohibitions, the Convention Against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
 
 10. See FRANCOISE BOUCHET-SAULNIER, THE PRACTICAL GUIDE TO HU-
MANITARIAN LAW, at xvi (2014) (“[Inability] wrongly implies that States are 
unable to anticipate crimes and abuses they will later accept to commit, 
whether in the name of highly questionable or highly legitimate causes.”). 
 11. Autonomous Weapons – Q &A, INT’L COMMISSION FOR THE RED CROSS 
(Nov. 10, 2014), https://www.icrc.org/en/document/autonomous-weapon 
-systems-challenge-human-control-over-use-force. 
 12. Thomasen, supra note 6, at 329. 
 13. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SHAKING THE FOUNDATIONS: THE 
HUMAN RIGHTS IMPLICATIONS OF KILLER ROBOTS 5 (2014) (outlining several 
nations calling for a ban); Bonnie Docherty, The Trouble with Killer Robots, 
FOREIGN POL’Y (Nov. 19, 2012), http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/11/19/the-trouble 
-with-killer-robots (arguing “governments should adopt an international pro-
hibition on the development, production, and use” of such weapons). 
 14. See, e.g., GARY D. SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: INTERNA-
TIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW IN WAR 535 (2d ed. 2016); Kenneth Anderson & 
Matthew C. Waxman, Laws and Ethics for Autonomous Weapons Systems: 
Why a Ban Won’t Work and How the Laws of War Can 2 (Am. Univ. Wash. 
Coll. of Law, Research Paper No. 2013–11). 
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Punishment (CAT), obsolete in the realm of autonomous inter-
rogation. 
This Note addresses the unprecedented effect autonomous 
robots will have on the scope of current prohibitions against 
torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment and ex-
plains the need for a linguistic reexamination to close gaps in 
language likely to result from a shared post-human world.15 
This emergent space recognizes the increased prominence of 
post-humanism, or the ideology that moves away from the hu-
man as possessing an essential element and speaking to the co-
evolutionary spiral of technology and humanity as intertwined, 
thus calling into question conceptions of autonomy and agen-
cy.16 
Part I of this Note examines current international prohibi-
tions on and rhetorical circumventions of torture as well as 
theoretical bases for scope limitations of torture prohibitions. 
Part II discusses how the lack of consensus regarding post-
human visions of technology may create a vacuum of liability 
upon the introduction of autonomous robots into interrogative 
spaces and threaten the ability to hold those responsible for 
torture accountable. Part III proposes guidelines for an Addi-
tional Protocol to the CAT to specifically and unambiguously 
ban torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment 
or punishment through mediums of automata or autonomous 
devices. Accordingly, this Note concludes that a specifically tai-
lored prohibition is necessary to avoid being “one technological 
revolution” behind in the protection of one of the most funda-
mental human rights: the right to be free from torture.17 
 
 15. This Note does not engage in the important debate surrounding the 
moral and ethical questions inherent in creating and utilizing such systems, 
nor does it examine the arguments that autonomous weapons systems are a 
technological impossibility. Further, while there is an important debate re-
garding the validity and workability of complete bans on the development of 
autonomous weapons systems, this Note instead assumes the inevitability of 
the existence of such systems. This Note also will not discuss the significant 
constitutional issues to be assessed with regard to the right to silence and the 
right to privacy in the context of interrogation performed by autonomous ro-
bots. See, e.g., Thomasen, supra note 6. 
 16. N. KATHERINE HAYLES, HOW WE BECAME POSTHUMAN: VIRTUAL BOD-
IES IN CYBERNETICS, LITERATURE, AND INFORMATICS 2–4 (1999). 
 17. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, art. 5, Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(Dec. 10, 1948). 
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I.  AUTONOMOUS ROBO-INTERROGATORS AND THE 
THREAT POSED TO THE SCOPE OF TORTURE 
PROHIBITIONS   
Prohibitions on torture have proliferated extensively since 
the Second World War.18 However, the integration of autono-
mous robots into torture and interrogation spaces threatens to 
render previous protections stagnant and leave newly created 
gaps open to exploitation and, consequently, impunity. This 
Part will discuss the new and emerging technologies in domes-
tic, battlefield, and interrogation spaces as well as the limita-
tions constricting coverage, including rhetorical, cultural, and 
doctrinal components facing disjunction upon the introduction 
of autonomous robots. 
Section A discusses the concept of autonomous weapons 
systems, limited autonomy in current use, and the projected 
development of autonomous robots. Further, it explores the 
technologies most likely to be utilized in a robo-interrogative 
scenario. Section B addresses constrictions to the scope of the 
prohibition, including the current, decaying language of the 
CAT and the infamous rhetorical evasion of its coverage in the 
U.S. “torture memos” controversy. Last, it considers theoretical 
limitations, including the cultural relativism of anthropomorp-
hization19 of robots and predictive conceptions of post-
humanism.20 
 
 18. See supra note 1. 
 19. Anthropomorphism is the attribution of human traits or behaviors to 
a non-human: 
One approach to enhance people’s acceptance of robots is the attempt 
to increase a robot’s familiarity by using anthropomorphic (human-
like) design and “human social” characteristics. This implies human-
like parts of a robot’s physical shape, the usage of facial expressions 
and other social cues, as well as natural humanlike interaction and 
communication . . . . An underlying assumption is that humans prefer 
to interact with machines in the same way they interact with other 
people. 
Julia Fink, Anthropomorphism and Human Likeness in the Design of Robots 
and Human-Robot Interaction, 7621 SOC. ROBOTICS 199, 199 (2012). 
 20. Post humanism provides a recalibrated lens with which to view the 
intertwining of humans and technology: 
As long as the human subject is envisioned as an autonomous self 
with unambiguous boundaries, the human-computer interface can on-
ly be parsed as a division between the solidity of real life on one side 
and the illusion of virtual reality on the other, thus obscuring the far-
reaching changes initiated by the development of virtual technologies 
. . . . [W]hen the human is seen as part of a distributed system, the 
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A. ROBOTS: AUTONOMY, PROLIFERATION, AND INTEGRATION 
INTO INTERROGATION 
This Section will discuss the current state of robotics de-
velopment. It will also explain the projected development and 
current efforts underway to achieve true artificial intelligence. 
Last, it will explore theories on how robots would be utilized in 
interrogative spaces. 
1. Autonomous Robots 
It is critical to define what constitutes an “autonomous” ro-
bot as opposed to “automatic” one. First, robots typically re-
quire “three key components: ‘sensors’ that monitor the envi-
ronment and detect changes in it, ‘processors’ or ‘artificial 
intelligence’ that decides how to respond, and ‘effectors’ that act 
upon the environment in a manner that reflects the decisions of 
the processors.”21 Then, autonomy depends on the robot’s ability 
to “operate without any form of external control for an extended 
period.”22 Autonomous weapons would be “weapons with the 
capacity to utilize artificial intelligence to replicate human cog-
nitive reasoning.”23 So, while many military weapons, such as 
drones, are still controlled by an operator, an autonomous24 sys-
 
full expression of human capability can be seen precisely to depend on 
the splice rather than being imperiled by it. 
HAYLES, supra note 16, at 290; cf. Francesca Ferrando, Posthumanism, 
Transhumanism, Antihumanism, Metahumanism, and New Materialisms: Dif-
ferences and Relations, 8 EXISTENZ 26, 26 (2013) (arguing posthuman has be-
come a confusing umbrella term). 
 21. Michael Kolb, Soldier and Robot Interaction in Combat Environments 
8 (2012) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Oklahoma) (on file 
with author). 
 22. Id. at 9; cf. Merel Noorman & Deborah G. Johnson, Negotiating Au-
tonomy and Responsibility in Military Robots, 16 ETHICS INFO. TECH. 52 
(2014) (arguing the concept of autonomy is used metaphorically). 
 23. Geoffrey S. Corn, Autonomous Weapons Systems: Managing the Inevi-
tability of “Taking the Man out of the Loop” (June 14, 2014), http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=2450640 (citation omitted). 
 24. Yet, there are many stops on the spectrum of autonomy for a weapons 
system. For example, remote-controlled systems have virtually no autonomy, 
as they are incapable of acting without an operator. See Kolb, supra note 21, at 
24. Tele-operated systems may have one or more integrated sensors used for 
navigation and other tasks. Id. Semi-autonomous systems would use “onboard 
sensing and processing” to control some of their functions. Id. Many un-
manned aerial vehicles, such as the Grey Eagle UAV, are semi-autonomous 
systems. Id. 
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tem would be able to control and make decisions for itself.25 
Truly autonomous systems would be self-governing and incor-
porate strong artificial intelligence capable of “choosing their 
own course of action to reach a desired goal.”26 
2. Development of Autonomous Systems 
This Section explores the current state of artificial intelli-
gence and autonomy in use on the battlefield as well as the pro-
jected development of autonomous weapons on the battlefield, 
domestic, and public spaces. 
a. Limited Autonomous Systems and Projected Development 
Robotic systems are “widely present in the modern battle-
field providing intelligence gathering, surveillance, reconnais-
sance, target acquisition, designation and engagement capabili-
ties.”27 The Samsung SGR-A1 surveillance and security guard 
robot on the border of North and South Korea is capable of se-
lecting and engaging targets and delivering lethal force without 
intervention by a human operator.28 There are also the human-
supervised U.S. autonomous systems—“the Aegis at sea and 
the Patriot on land”—capable of defending “against short-notice 
missile attacks.”29 Other examples of such systems with limited 
autonomy are the Phalanx system, “capable of autonomously 
performing its own search, detect, evaluation, track, engage 
and kill assessment functions,” and “Israel’s Iron Dome [anti-
missile] system.”30 In addition, there is the tele-operated iRobot 
Packbot series, the unmanned ground vehicle (UGV) Foster-
Miller TALON series, and the AeroVironment RQ-11 Raven, an 
unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) capable of complete autono-
mous flight via GPS waypoint navigation.31 
In the realm of artificial intelligence, one of the most fa-
mous example of a computer displaying high levels of intelli-
gence is the IBM computer Deep Blue.32 On May 11, 1997, Deep 
 
 25. Grut, supra note 4, at 5. 
 26. SOLIS, supra note 14, at 537–38; Grut, supra note 4, at 6. 
 27. Arkin, supra note 4. 
 28. SOLIS, supra note 14. 
 29. Id. at 535–36. 
 30. Id. at 536; Arkin, supra note 4. 
 31. Kolb, supra note 21, at 10–12. 
 32. Icons of Progress: Deep Blue, IBM, http://www-03.ibm.com/ibm/history/ 
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Blue beat the world chess champion in a match that lasted sev-
eral days.33 It demonstrated the ever-increasing ability of com-
puters to handle complex calculations, perform risk analysis, 
and identify trends. Deep Blue also stands as an example for 
the potential of computers to possess intentionality.34 
Truly autonomous systems have not been developed yet.35 
Yet, the advantages of such systems, including “enhanc[ing] 
situational awareness, reduc[ing] human workload, improv[ing] 
mission performance and minimiz[ing] overall risk to civilian 
and military personnel, and all at a reduced cost” will push na-
tions to continue their development.36 Regardless of how immi-
nent true autonomy is, governments and the United Nations 
are preparing for the possibility and developing more limited-
autonomy systems.37 The U.S. Department of Defense issued 
the world’s first policy pronouncement on autonomous weapons 
 
ibm100/us/en/icons/deepblue (last visited May 12, 2017). 
 33. Id. 
 34. The Chinese Room Argument: Intentionality, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA 
PHIL. (Apr. 9, 2014), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/chinese-room/#5.2 (“In-
tentionality is the property of being about something, having content . . . . Be-
liefs and desires are intentional states: they have propositional content . . . . 
[A]pplie[d] to computers[,] . . . [w]e can interpret the states of a computer as 
having content, but the states themselves do not have original intentionali-
ty.”). After Deep Blue’s success, IBM built Watson, a computer that beat two of 
the most successful human players of Jeopardy! while also demonstrating a 
substantial advancement in programming from Deep Blue. See Joe Best, IBM 
Watson: The Inside Story of How the Jeopardy-Winning Supercomputer Was 
Born, and What It Wants To Do Next, TECHREPUBLIC (Sept. 10, 2013), http:// 
www.techrepublic.com/article/ibm-watson-the-inside-story-of-how-the 
-jeopardy-winning-supercomputer-was-born-and-what-it-wants-to-do-next. 
Watson was capable of processing and reasoning from natural language and 
performing accurate processing of its massive supply of information. Daniel C. 
Dennett, When HAL Kills, Who’s To Blame? Computer Ethics, in HAL’S LEGA-
CY: 2001’S COMPUTER AS DREAM AND REALITY 352 (David G. Stork ed., 1997). 
While agreeing “skeletal versions of human beliefs and desires” are not suffi-
cient to meet mens rea requirement of legal culpability, he states, “it is hard to 
see what is missing.” Id. 
 35. Grut, supra note 4, at 6. 
 36. SOLIS, supra note 14, at 536. 
 37. There has been significant public backlash to the development of au-
tonomous systems, as well. More than 1000 robotics researchers and experts 
signed an open letter calling for a ban on “offensive autonomous weapons,” in-
cluding Steve Wozniak, Demis Hassabis, Stephen Hawking, and Elon Musk. 
Samuel Gibbs, Musk, Wozniak and Hawking Urge Ban on Warfare AI and Au-
tonomous Weapons, THE GUARDIAN (July 27, 2015), http://www.theguardian 
.com/technology/2015/jul/27/musk-wozniak-hawking-ban-ai-autonomous 
-weapons. 
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systems in 2012, stating that, for the term of the directive, hu-
mans must remain “in the loop,” or, the last point of authoriza-
tion in any decision involving lethal force, in the application of 
lethal force by autonomous weapons systems.38 The directive 
must be reissued, cancelled, or certified by November 21, 2017, 
or it will expire on November 21, 2022.39 
In 2015 and 2016, the UN held their annual Convention on 
Certain Conventional Weapons to debate a ban on lethal au-
tonomous weapons systems, fearing a “robotic arms race” lead-
ing to deployment of lethal weapons incapable of compatibility 
with the laws of armed conflict and international law.40 
There are no multinational treaties, UN conventions, or 
other policy pronouncements that regulate this emerging space. 
Yet, as this “new age of machines empowered to make decisions 
about life and death . . . dawn[s] a[nd] research in artificial in-
telligence advances,” discussion and debate on autonomous 
weapons have drastically increased.41 
b. Robots and Autonomous Systems in Domestic and Public 
Spaces 
Proliferation of robots and other autonomous systems is 
unlikely to be restricted to the battlefield.42 In the United 
States, the National Robotics Initiative, supported by multiple 
agencies of the federal government, released a plan to fund re-
search on robots, including the field of Artificial Intelligence 
 
 38. U.S. Dep’t of Def., Directive 3000.09, Autonomy in Weapons Systems 
(2012), http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/300009p.pdf. 
 39. Id. 
 40. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
 41. Andrew Hanna, Killer Robots Await Trump’s Verdict, POLITICO (Dec. 
25, 2016), http://www.politico.com/story/2016/12/drones-military-technology 
-trump-232933. 
 42. The Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry of Japan (METI) desig-
nated robots as one of “the seven most critical industrial fields” in its Strategy 
for Creating New Industries. Naho Kitano, Animism, Rinri, Modernization; 
The Base of Japanese Robotics 4 (Jan. 5, 2007) (unpublished manuscript) (on 
file with author). METI released New Robot Strategy: Vision, Strategy, Action 
Plan in 2015, which claims Japan’s status as a “Robotics Superpower” and 
warns that “Japan will be isolated from the rest of the world in the field of ro-
bots” if Japan lags behind in robot development. MINISTRY OF ECON., TRADE & 
INDUS., NEW ROBOT STRATEGY: JAPAN’S ROBOT STRATEGY: VISION, STRATEGY, 
ACTION PLAN 2, 5 (2015). METI further urged a “major innovation in robotics 
including robot technology and robot utilization system[s]” to serve as effective 
tools in Japan’s social and economic challenges. Id. at 6. 
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(AI),43 with the goal of accelerating development and use of ro-
bots in the United States that “work beside, or cooperatively 
with, people.”44 In October 2016, the White House released the 
report Preparing for the Future of Artificial Intelligence to ad-
dress opportunities and challenges of such systems and to pro-
vide guidelines on the development and incorporation of artifi-
cial intelligence in various sectors to contribute to economic 
growth.45 On November 30, 2016, Senator Ted Cruz chaired the 
Senate Commerce Subcommittee on Space, Science and Com-
petitiveness hearing, “The Dawn of Artificial Intelligence,” the 
first-ever congressional hearing dedicated to AI. There, he de-
clared we are “on the verge of a new technological revolution 
thanks to rapid advances in processing power.”46 
In addition, demand for robots worldwide has increased 
dramatically.47 Market researcher Forrester released a report 
predicting a greater than 300% increase in artificial intelli-
gence investments.48 Indeed, this past year alone, we have seen 
widespread domestic and commercial use of robots, including 
unmanned aerial drones.49 
Self-driving cars have moved from a dream of the future to 
a reality: the 2017 Kia Forte touts its “autonomous emergency 
 
 43. NAT’L ROBOTICS INITIATIVE, THE REALIZATION OF CO-ROBOTS ACTING 
IN DIRECT SUPPORT OF INDIVIDUALS AND GROUPS 2 (Oct. 4, 2012), http://www 
.nsf.gov/pubs/2012/nsf12607/nsf12607.pdf. 
 44. Id. Anticipated funding is $40 million to $50 million per year. Id. 
 45. NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE OF ARTIFI-
CIAL INTELLIGENCE (2016) (addressing regulation of AI); see also Ed Felten & 
Terah Lyons, The Administration’s Report on the Future of Artificial Intelli-
gence, WHITE HOUSE BLOG (Oct. 12, 2016), https://www.obamawhitehouse 
.archives.gov/blog/2016/10/12/administrations-report-future-artificial 
-intelligence. 
 46. Press Release, Ted Cruz, Sen. Cruz Chairs First Congressional Hear-
ing on Artificial Intelligence (Nov. 30, 2016) (on file with author). Senator 
Cruz argued, “Ceding leadership in developing artificial intelligence to China, 
Russia and other foreign governments will not only place the United States at 
a technological disadvantage but it could also have implications for national 
security.” Id. He concluded by declaring that while “[t]his is the first congres-
sional hearing on artificial intelligence . . . it will not be the last.” Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Gil Press, Forrester Predicts Investment in Artificial Intelligence Will 
Grow 300% in 2017, FORBES (Nov. 1, 2016), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
gilpress/2016/11/01/forrester-predicts-investment-in-artificial-intelligence-will 
-grow-300-in-2017. 
 49. Drew Prindle, The Best Drone You Can Buy, DIGITAL TRENDS (Oct. 19, 
2016), http://www.digitaltrends.com/cool-tech/best-drones. 
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braking systems” as a solution to distracted driving.50 As of Oc-
tober 19, 2016, all Tesla vehicles have the requisite hardware 
for full self-driving capabilities.51 Ford has announced it will re-
lease self-driving cars by 2021 to enhance mobility, announcing 
itself as a “company of the future, not of the past.”52 Golf carts 
and scooters are also implementing autonomous car software 
and sensor configuration.53 Several states have passed autono-
mous vehicle legislation to permit testing and use of self-
driving cars and trucks on roads.54 
Robots are increasingly being integrated into the workforce 
and replacing human workers.55 For example, Fukoku Mutual 
Life Insurance is utilizing IBM’s Watson Explorer, capable of 
analysis and interpretation of text, image, audio and visual da-
 
 50. Kia Motors Am., The New 2017 Kia Forte – Car Karaoke with Auton-
omous Emergency Breaking, YOUTUBE (Sept. 7, 2016), https://www.youtube 
.com/watch?v=Z3aBucvZ_Vg. 
 51. All Tesla Cars Being Produced Now Have Full Self-Driving Hardware, 
TESLA: BLOG (Oct. 19, 2016), https://www.tesla.com/blog/all-tesla-cars-being 
-produced-now-have-full-self-driving-hardware (describing the hardware speci-
fications). Tesla claims this will be “substantially safer” than a human driver. 
Id. 
 52. Daniel Newman, Autonomous Cars: The Future of Mobility, FORBES 
(Sept. 27, 2016), http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielnewman/2016/09/27/ 
autonomous-cars-the-future-of-mobility. BMW is likely on the same timeline 
as Ford. Id. 
 53. Driverless Cars, Golf Carts, Now Joined by Autonomous Scooter, SCI. 
DAILY (Nov. 8, 2016), https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2016/11/ 
161108120609.htm. 
 54. Press Release, Mich. Governor Rick Snyder, Gov. Rick Snyder Signs 
Landmark Legislation To Allow Operation of Autonomous Vehicles on Michi-
gan Roadways (Dec. 9, 2016), http://www.michigan.gov/snyder/0,4668,7-277 
--399173--,00.html. Some robotics experts predict that that car ownership and 
use as we know it will be fundamentally changed by the autonomous future. 
Alex Nishimoto, Robotics Expert Predicts Kids Born Today Will Never Drive a 
Car, MOTOR TREND (Jan. 3, 2017), http://www.motortrend.com/news/robotics 
-expert-predicts-kids-born-today-will-never-drive-car. 
 55. Some fear the impact on industries could lead to displacement of jobs 
spread unevenly across the economy, leading to an exacerbation of wealth ine-
quality. Arjun Kharpal, AI Could Boost Productivity but Increase Wealth Ine-
quality, the White House Says, CNBC (Dec. 21, 2016), http://www.cnbc.com/ 
2016/12/21/ai-could-boost-productivity-but-increase-wealth-inequality-the 
-white-house-says.html; see also Mark B. Solomon, Autonomous Heavy-Duty 
Trucks Threaten Jobs of Nearly 1.7 Million Drivers, White House Says, D.C. 
VELOCITY (Jan. 3, 2017), http://www.dcvelocity.com/articles/20170103 
-autonomous-heavy-duty-trucks-threaten-jobs-of-nearly-17-million-drivers 
-white-house-says. 
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ta, to calculate payouts to policyholders.56 A Nomura Research 
Institute report has claimed that robots could perform half of 
the jobs in Japan by 2035.57 The technology is rapidly evolving, 
and necessitates responses from law and policy. 
3. Robots in Policing Spaces 
Even with the increasing amount of robots in domestic 
spaces, the thought of robots being used by police or security 
forces in interrogation spaces sounds like something out a sci-
ence fiction film. Yet, robots have already been incorporated in-
to domestic policing in the United States. During the 2016 
shooting of Dallas police officers, law enforcement used a tele-
operated robot armed with C-4 plastic explosives to remotely 
detonate near and kill the sniper who ambushed five officers.58 
This surprised many, as “the public is not widely aware that 
police departments have robots.”59 
Police departments have also used unmanned aircrafts.60 
Several states have responded with requiring police to obtain 
warrants prior to any aerial surveillance or by limiting the abil-
ity to retain collected data.61 No such responses have occurred 
regarding ground-based robots, although police are using robots 
to defuse explosives and deliver cell phones to facilitate negoti-
ations in the expansion of this uncharted territory.62 
Further, the use of robots by domestic agencies is only like-
ly to grow. The FBI, sheriff ’s departments, and federal and lo-
cal agencies all are in possession of robots, and often from a 
federal program that has transferred $6 billion in excess U.S. 
military equipment to local law enforcement agencies since the 
 
 56. Justin McCurry, Japanese Company Replaces Office Workers with Ar-
tificial Intelligence, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 5, 2017), https://www.theguardian 
.com/technology/2017/jan/05/japanese-company-replaces-office-workers 
-artificial-intelligence-ai-fukoku-mutual-life-insurance. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Kevin Sullivan et al., Dallas Police Used a Robot To Kill. What Does 
That Mean for the Future of Police Robots?, WASH. POST (July 21, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/dallas-police-used-a-robot-to-kill 
-what-does-that-mean-for-the-future-of-police-robots/2016/07/20/32ee114e 
-4a84-11e6-bdb9-701687974517_story.html. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
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1990s.63 As such, the proliferation of autonomous weapons sys-
tems in armed conflict and military spaces will continue being 
reflected in domestic policing. 
Since the Dallas shootings, many have expressed concern 
over weaponizing robots for police purposes.64 Indeed, the “ab-
sence of law and policy . . . has the potential to lead to overuse 
of machines that can be used to injure or kill suspects.”65 These 
concerns are compounded in the context of interrogation. 
4. Robots in Interrogative Spaces 
Now, it may be difficult to imagine what legitimate pur-
poses robots could serve in lawful interrogative spaces. Howev-
er, with increasing developments in human-computer interac-
tion research and physiological measurement devices, combined 
with the inability of humans to act as effective lie detectors and 
the traditional reliance on technology to enhance human capac-
ities, such a space is “not out of the realm of possibility.”66 In-
deed, autonomous interviewers would permit governments and 
agencies reliable, low-intrusive, and cost-effective means of in-
terviewing large groups of people quickly or detecting weapons 
at common security points.67 
This Section will discuss what a robo-interrogator would 
be, the technology it would likely be equipped with, and exist-
ing precursors. 
a. A Robo-Interrogator 
A robot interrogator would be “any automated technology 
that examines an individual through questioning . . . for the 
 
 63. Id. “Since 2003, 280 law enforcement agencies have obtained at least 
987 reconnaissance and bomb-disposal robots from the military . . . .” Id. 
 64. Brigitt Keller of the National Police Accountability Project argues that 
use of a robot for killing was equivalent to being summarily executed outside 
the Constitution. See id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Kristen Thomasen, Liar, Liar, Pants on Fire! Examining the Constitu-
tionality of Enhanced Robo-Interrogation 2 (2012) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://robots.law.miami.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Thomasen_ 
CONSTITUTIONALITY-OF-ROBOT-INTERROGATION.pdf. “Humans are 
generally poor lie detectors (not usually accurate above 60%) . . . .” Id. at 1 n.2. 
 67. Simon Parkin, The Police Are Recruiting Interrogation Bots, HOW WE 
GET TO NEXT (May 20, 2016), https://howwegettonext.com/the-police-are 
-recruiting-interrogation-bots-e6fd68286ef3. 
  
2017] STRANGER THAN SCIENCE FICTION 2541 
 
purpose of eliciting incriminating statements or confessions.”68 
One scholar argues that “psychological interrogation tech-
niques and behavioral lie-detection methods” are the “twin pil-
lars” of interrogation.69 As such, the robot interrogator would 
have to exceed the human interrogator in these capabilities to 
be considered desirable and incorporated into the interrogation 
space.70 
In 1983, the CIA experimented with the first known robo-
interrogator.71 In the since declassified document “Interrogation 
of an Alleged CIA Agent,” the CIA attempted the use of a mi-
crocomputer in interrogation through Analiza, a primitive arti-
ficial intelligence program which utilized sophisticated algo-
rithms to formulate replies.72 Significantly, “[b]ecause it retains 
in its memory the topics covered, it will have more surprises in 
store for [the subject] as the sessions continue; with time it be-
comes increasingly more knowledgeable about [its subject].”73 
The program probed for its subject’s vulnerabilities and ex-
erted defense measures against hostility.74 The report concludes 
by stating that “[a]s for [the subject], he is fortunate that 
should the probing get too discomforting, he will have an option 
that will not be available to him in a true overseas interview 
situation—he can stop the questions with a flick of the ‘off ’ 
switch.”75 True robo-interrogators would provide no such com-
fort to the detainees. 
b. Deception-Detection 
A robot interrogator, with the combination of human-
computer technology and sensors capable of monitoring physio-
logical responses,76 would be desirable to state agencies in ex-
 
 68. Thomasen, supra note 66, at 3. 
 69. Id. 
 70. See id. 
 71. Jordan Pearson, The CIA Used Artificial Intelligence To Interrogate Its 
Own Agents in the 80s, MOTHERBOARD (Sept. 22, 2014), https://motherboard 
.vice.com/en_us/article/the-cia-used-artificial-intelligence-to-interrogate-its 
-own-agents-in-the-80s. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Interrogation of an Alleged CIA Agent, 27 STUD. INTELLIGENCE 49, 53 
(1983), https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000619182.pdf. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 54. 
 76. A human-computer interaction (HCI) system would be equipped with 
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tracting and evaluating information for truthfulness in interro-
gations.77 Robots would not be the first technology incorporated 
into interrogations to evaluate deception; polygraphs and brain 
scans have both previously been used.78 Robots, however, would 
be equipped with deception-detection technologies and be capa-
ble of manipulating conversations.79 Consequently, they could 
interrogate and interview better than human counterparts.80 
Such a robot would be a solution to the significant blind spots 
human interrogators possess when it comes to deception-
detection. 
c. Interrogation Techniques 
Some scholars have argued that robots could meet or ex-
ceed the capabilities of the human interrogator, partially be-
cause humans are inclined to respond to robots in similar ways 
as they do to humans.81 Human-computer interaction (HCI) re-
searcher Joseph Weizenbaum, after studying human conversa-
tion with his computer program ELIZA, “concluded that people 
might even be more willing to open up to automated conversa-
tional counterparts than to other humans,” particularly if the 
robot is anthropomorphized.82 
Robots could be equipped with sensor technology to not on-
ly build rapport, but to utilize persuasive techniques as well. 
These would include flattery, shame, intimidation, and strate-
gic use of body language.83 Further, designers could use physi-
cal subtleties to further personalize the interrogation space, 
such as manipulating the robot’s appearance, voice, and size for 
strategic purposes.84 Different attributes, such as “facial struc-
ture, voice pitch, tempo, volume, [and] accent,” could be manip-
ulated and tailored to perceptions about the individual person 
 
“a combination of visual, auditory, near-infrared and other sensors to monitor 
a suspect’s eye movements, voice, and various other qualities throughout an 
interaction.” Thomasen, supra note 66, abstract. 
 77. Id. at 1. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. See id. at 1–2. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 4. 
 83. Id. at 1, 3–4, 6. 
 84. Id. at 6. 
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to be interrogated.85 Their utility would be in their capacity to 
be more adept at recognizing human emotions than humans 
are. 
d. Development of Robot Interrogators 
Researchers at the University of Arizona developed auto-
mated interrogation technology to use in pre-screening inter-
views of individuals seeking to pass through the United States 
borders.86 A member of the team has indicated their usefulness 
in deception technology: “People have a hard time detecting 
small changes in the frequency of the human voice, that a com-
puter is much better at. People are accurate about 54 percent of 
the time at detecting deception . . . . We have got our machine 
as high as 90 percent in the lab.”87 The Automated Virtual 
Agent for Truth Assessments in Real Time (AVATAR) is in a 
testing phase with the Canadian Border Services Agency to as-
sist border security agents in truth-telling determinations.88 A 
required kiosk “asks questions of travelers and can detect 
changes in physiology and behavior during the interview. The 
system can detect changes in the eyes, voice, gestures and pos-
ture to determine potential risk. It can even tell when you’re 
curling your toes.”89 One of AVATAR’s developers, Aaron 
Elkins, claims:  
[AVATAR] can be used not just for border security, but also for law 
enforcement, job interviews[,] and other human resources applica-
tions as well . . . . The system is fully ready for implementation to 
help stem the flow of contraband, thwart fleeing criminals, and detect 
potential terrorists and many other applications in the effort to secure 
international borders.90 
Another robo-interrogator in development is the more in-
nocuous-sounding Brad at the University of Twente in the 
Netherlands. Brad is being developed to determine if a robotic 
 
 85. Id. 
 86. Border Patrol Kiosk Detects Liars Trying To Enter U.S., HOMELAND 
SECURITY NEWS WIRE (Aug. 21, 2012), http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire 
.com/dr20120821-border-patrol-kiosk-detects-liars-trying-to-enter-u-s. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Suzanne Finch, The Lie-Detecting Security Kiosk of the Future, 
PHYS.ORG (Dec. 28, 2016), https://phys.org/news/2016-12-lie-detecting-kiosk 
-future.html. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
  
2544 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [101:2527 
 
interviewer can measure physiological cues.91 Researchers 
Merijn Bruijnes and Sabine Strofer are conducting experiments 
to see if robots could measure physiological cues to deception, 
and if so, whether robots like Brad may be used as police inter-
viewers to fill the demand of governments and agencies in de-
ception-detection.92 
[While] Brad is a long way from the kind of fully autonomous police 
robot that might present a threat to a human’s life[,] . . . the use of 
such techniques in live police operations raises difficult questions, 
particularly about the potential that a more advanced version of Brad 
might have for harming its targets.93 
e. Harm 
A significant concern would be the ethical framework in 
which the robot would operate and its capacity to cause dis-
tress.94 While torture and inhuman treatment during interroga-
tion is prohibited, such rules do not cover or consider robot ac-
tors. Indeed, the notorious “enhanced interrogation techniques” 
used to torture and subject detainees to cruel, inhuman and 
degrading treatment under the Bush Administration’s war on 
terror could be revived through the moral and ethical issues in-
volved in AI interrogation.95 “When your captor is a machine, 
there is no humaneness to be found, and, hence, no one to plead 
with. When even that small avenue of humanity is done away 
with in the proceedings of state-sponsored barbarism, what is 
left? Illegal detainments could continue with only slight human 
involvement.”96 One example of the potential for distress is Mi-
crosoft’s AI chatbot Tay: 
[Tay] became a racist monster in fewer than 48 hours, prompting the 
company to remove the software from the [I]nternet. Unless pro-
grammed to work with a highly limited number of interview ques-
tions, which could prove too restrictive to be useful, there is potential 
for any autonomous piece of software to cause distress when interact-
ing with humans, particularly if elevated to a position of institutional 
authority such as the police.97 
 
 91. Parkin, supra note 67. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Pearson, supra note 72. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Parkin, supra note 67. 
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The benefits of robot interrogators have already been rec-
ognized. As such, it is imperative to consider the likely presence 
of robot interrogators in other security contexts as well as how 
the severing of mens rea and actus reus between a human in-
volved in an interrogation and a robot who engages in unlawful 
interrogation could evade the CAT’s definition of torture and 
cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment. This growing tear in 
the fabric of interrogation regulations demonstrates the need 
for a response in law and policy. 
B. LIMITATIONS TO PROTECTION FROM TORTURE COMMITTED BY 
AUTONOMOUS ROBOTS 
The proliferation and projected development of artificial in-
telligence makes discussion of potential legal challenges, par-
ticularly those involving fundamental human rights, of the ut-
most importance to avoid being “one technological revolution” 
behind. This Section discusses the foremost treaty on torture 
prohibitions, the UN Convention Against Torture, the United 
States’ understanding to the CAT requiring “specific intent” for 
an act to constitute torture, and the subsequent rhetorical eva-
sion that occurred in the infamous U.S. “torture memos” scan-
dal as an illustration of the ways language can be manipulated 
to avoid obligations under international treaties. Then, it dis-
cusses theoretical limitations to protection, specifically cultural 
approaches to the anthropomorphization of robots and how that 
may affect language interwoven into incoming visions of tech-
nology in the context of a growing post-human movement. 
1. The CAT 
This Section discusses the exploitable language of the CAT 
as well as the United States’ specific intent understanding to 
the treaty. Then, it examines the rhetorical evasion in the Of-
fice of Legal Counsel’s “torture memos” to illustrate the capaci-
ty for linguistic manipulation to avoid human rights obligations 
and justify violations. 
a. The Language of the CAT 
In 1984, the UN General Assembly adopted the CAT to 
strengthen existing customary international law norms against 
torture and require state parties to prosecute anyone who 
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commits torture within their jurisdiction.98 Article 1 defines tor-
ture as: 
[A]ny act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or men-
tal, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtain-
ing from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing 
him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of 
having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, 
or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain 
or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent 
or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official 
capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, in-
herent in[,] or incidental to[,] lawful sanctions.99 
Article 2 prohibits torture and requires state parties to prose-
cute or take other effective measures to prevent it in any terri-
tory under their jurisdiction.100 Significantly, Article 2 requires 
that there are no exceptions to the prohibition, including war, 
threat of war, public emergency, or command responsibility.101 
Significantly, Article 16 requires parties to prevent, “other acts 
of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment which 
do not amount to torture as defined in [A]rticle 1.”102 
b. The Nature of Intent 
Intent, or dolus directus, in international law entails 
“awareness that by engaging in a certain action or by omitting 
to act I shall bring about a certain result . . . coupled with . . . 
the will to cause such result.”103 The majority of international 
crimes require intent. Intent includes the “natural consequenc-
es of [one’s] actions” as articulated in the post-World War II 
Enigster case where a Nazi Schieber was accused of crimes 
against humanity for injuries inflicted on Jewish internees in a 
Nazi concentration camp.104 
Premeditation is not ordinarily a required element for in-
ternational criminal responsibility and usually serves as an ag-
 
 98. JEFFREY L. DUNOFF ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: NORMS, ACTORS, 
PROCESS 413 (3d ed. 2010). 
 99. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, art. 1, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, 113–14. 
 100. Id. at 114. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 116. 
 103. ANTONIO CASSESE ET AL., CASSESE’S INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 
43 (3d ed. 2013). 
 104. Id. at 43–44. 
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gravating circumstance in sentencing decisions.105 Some inter-
national crimes require a special intent, or a dolus specialis, for 
particular crimes, requiring that the “agent pursue a specific 
goal that goes beyond the result of his conduct.”106 These crimes 
include genocide, persecution, forced pregnancy, and terror-
ism.107 
Intent includes recklessness as “a state of mind where a 
person foresees that his or her action is likely to produce its 
prohibited consequences, and nevertheless willingly takes the 
risk of so acting.”108 Recklessness can satisfy the intent re-
quirement for torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading 
treatment, as exemplified in the 1933 L. and others (Pig-Cart 
Parade) case by the Supreme Court in the British Occupied 
Zone in Germany.109 In this case, assault troopers paraded a so-
cialist senator and Jewish inhabitant through a small German 
town, where they were forced to wear demeaning signs around 
their neck while being led by a pig cart.110 The defendants par-
ticipated in vilifying and humiliating actions against the vic-
tims, thus: 
The Court held “that, as far as the involvement of three accused went, 
‘it was inconceivable’ that they, who were old officials of the Nazi par-
ty, ‘did not at least think it possible and consider that in the case at 
issue, through their participation, persons were being assaulted by a 
system of violence and injustice; more is not required for the mental 
element.’”111 
The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugo-
slavia (ICTY) developed significant jurisprudence regarding the 
nature of intent and command responsibility. In Prosecutor v. 
Blaškić, the ICTY Appeals Chamber required “a person ‘orders 
an act or omission with the awareness of a substantial likeli-
hood that a crime will be committed in the execution of that or-
der,’ because ‘ordering with such awareness has to be regarded 
as accepting the crime.’”112 
 
 105. Id. at 44. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 45. 
 108. Id. at 45–46. 
 109. Id. at 47–48. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 48. 
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c. Rhetorical Evasion: The United States’ “Specific Intent” 
Reservation to the CAT and the U.S. Torture Memos 
The United States became a party to the CAT in 1994 and 
ratified the treaty with various reservations and understand-
ings.113 Significantly, the United States stated the definition of 
“torture” required a necessary but not sufficient “specific in-
tent” for an act to constitute torture.114 Specifically, the under-
standing stated, “[W]ith reference to Article 1, the United 
States understands that, in order to constitute torture, an act 
must be specifically intended to inflict severe physical or men-
tal pain or suffering . . . .”115 Following the ratification of the 
CAT, the United States enacted 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340 and 2340A 
which criminalized any act outside of the U.S. to commit or at-
tempt to commit torture, thereby codifying its treaty obliga-
tions in domestic legislation.116 
Notwithstanding the vast international consensus and ex-
pansive legislation,117 the United States still committed state-
sanctioned torture and the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) justi-
fied it with the “specific intent” understanding to the CAT.118 
Throughout the Bush Administration’s tenure,119 the White 
House requested legal advice from the OLC to determine if 
 
 113. DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 98. 
 114. See 136 CONG. REC. S17,486 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990). 
 115. Id. (reading of assistant legis. clerk) (unanimous consent agreement 
and reservations to the ratification of The Convention Against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment). 
 116. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A (2012); DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 98, at 
424. 
 117. Internationally, the post-World War II Geneva Conventions compris-
ing international humanitarian law as well as the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights laying the foundation for international human rights law all 
explicitly state non-derogable prohibitions against the use of torture. DUNOFF 
ET AL., supra note 98, at 424. Further, the War Crimes Act of 1996 criminaliz-
es violations of Common Article 3 under the Geneva Conventions and the Mili-
tary Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000 further prohibits torture. Id. at 
434. 
 118. See Jesselyn Radack, Tortured Legal Ethics: The Role of the Govern-
ment Advisor in the War on Terrorism, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 24 n.161 (2006) 
(noting the legislative history of the U.S. adoption of the CAT). 
 119. After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the World Trade 
Center towers and the Pentagon, the Bush Administration determined the 
United States was in a “new kind of war” and that the quick attainment of 
useful intelligence was critical to the prevention of further attacks and 
achievement of military success. DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 98, at 406. Under 
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“enhanced interrogation techniques” (EITs), such as water-
boarding, would be lawful.120 Between “2002 and 2007, OLC 
lawyers John Yoo, Jay Bybee, and Steven Bradbury wrote a se-
ries of legal memoranda that served to sanction and authorize 
what most would deem acts of torture.”121 Significantly, the 
memos concluded that “a defendant [must] act with the specific 
intent to inflict severe pain.”122 In order to satisfy the mens rea 
requirement of specific intent, “the infliction of such pain must 
be the defendant’s precise objective.”123 As such, “even if the de-
fendant knows that severe pain will result from his actions, if 
causing such harm is not his objective, he lacks the requisite 
specific intent even though the defendant did not act in good 
faith.”124 This effectively shielded the prosecution of interroga-
tors who suggested that the obtainment of information and not 
the infliction of harm undergirded their actions. 
The exposure of the secret memos led to a broad array of 
criticism from international and constitutional law experts for 
creating loopholes in domestic and international law. Critics 
claimed the torture memos were designed to provide legal cover 
for those concerned about potential prosecution for torture and 
cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment because, under the 
specific intent standard, “if the accused knowingly causes pain 
or suffering but had some other objective for which pain and 
 
significant pressure to obtain such information, the Defense Department in-
terrogated many of the thousands of detainees suspected of being terrorists or 
possessing information about terrorists. Id.; Michelle Querijero, Note, Without 
Lawyers: An Ethical View of the Torture Memos, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 241, 
242 (2010). At this time, the official interrogation policy in the United States 
Army Field Manual permitted the use of “psychological ploys” but expressly 
prohibited “force, mental torture, threats, insults or exposure to unpleasant 
and inhumane treatment of any kind.” DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 98, at 406. 
 120. DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 98, at 407. 
 121. Annamaria Racota, The Torture Memos: Lawyers, Ethics, and the Rule 
of Law, HUM. RTS. BRIEF (Dec. 3, 2009), http://hrbrief.org/2009/12/torture 
-memos-lawyers-ethics-and-the-rule-of-law. “[T]he torture memos adopted a 
narrower definition of torture . . . . [A]buse constituted torture only if it result-
ed in organ failure or death.” Id. 
 122. Oona A. Hathaway et al., Tortured Reasoning: The Intent To Torture 
Under International and Domestic Law, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 791, 793 (2012) (al-
teration in original) (quoting Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant At-
torney Gen., to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, on Standards of 
Conduct for Interrogation under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A, at 3 (Aug. 1, 2002) 
[hereinafter Bybee Memo]). 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. (quoting Bybee Memo, supra note 122, at 4). 
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suffering was merely incidental, such as extracting infor-
mation, he lacks the requisite ‘specific intent.’”125 This argu-
ment is critical as it lays the foundation for the use of rhetoric 
to evade liability through the medium of robots and highlights 
the difficulties in defining intent when the action is splintered 
between an autonomous agent and its designers, engineers, 
programmers, and commanders. 
While some measures were taken after exposure of these 
memos,126 none have served to collapse the gaps capable of be-
ing exploited through the use of autonomous weapons in inter-
rogative spaces. Particularly because of the way the OLC uti-
lized rhetoric to claim EITs do not constitute torture if pain and 
suffering is not the precise objective, uncertainty regarding the 
types of characteristics we are willing to impute to robots could 
provide a similarly exploitable opening in intent-analysis. For 
example, if a robot were to perform an EIT, it would likely be 
considered to lack the required mens rea due to hesitancy in be-
lieving a robot could possess intent. Alternatively, in a more 
post-human cultural context, a robot may be deemed capable of 
possessing the required mens rea. Such a determination could 
make it more difficult to hold human actors involved in the vio-
lation criminally liable. 
 
 125. Id.; see also DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 98, at 427 (discussing the “ne-
cessity” defense to torture). 
 126. The Senate Intelligence Committee eventually released a report after 
a four-year investigation concluding the CIA’s “use of torture was brutal and 
ineffective . . . and that the CIA repeatedly lied about its usefulness.” Spencer 
Ackerman et al., Senate Report on CIA Torture Claims Spy Agency Lied About 
‘Ineffective’ Program, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 9, 2014), https://www.theguardian 
.com/us-news/2014/dec/09/cia-torture-report-released. Further, it was found 
that the use of torture in the CIA’s black sites and prisons was more extreme 
than previously thought. Id. The declassified section of the report reveals 
many of the EITs used, some of which international law experts say constitute 
rape under contemporary international law standards. Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, 
Sexual Torture, Rape, and Gender-Based Violence in the Senate Torture Re-
port, JUST SECURITY (Feb. 26, 2015), https://www.justsecurity.org/19731/ 
sexual-torture-rape-gender-based-violence-senate-committee-report. On No-
vember 25, 2015, President Obama signed into law an updated National De-
fense Authorization Act with a provision reinforcing the United States’ ban on 
torture. President Obama Signs National Defense Authorization Act Solidify-
ing Ban on Torture, HUM. RTS. FIRST (Nov. 25, 2015), http://www 
.humanrightsfirst.org/press-release/president-obama-signs-national-defense 
-authorization-act-solidifying-ban-torture. 
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2. Theoretical Limitations: Cultural Approaches to 
Anthropomorphization and Post-Humanism 
This Section discusses the significance of cultural ap-
proaches to anthropomorphization, focusing specifically on 
Western and Japanese approaches. Differing tendencies to-
wards anthropomorphization can affect a society’s acceptance of 
a technology and subsequently inform beliefs on liability, re-
sponsibility, and acceptance of the emerging technology. Then, 
it discusses the growing movement of post-humanism and ex-
plore how the changing philosophical and rhetorical backdrop 
to the emergence of autonomous robots could demagnetize lin-
guistic and syntactical aversions of concepts such as “intent,” 
with robots. 
a. Cultural Approaches to Anthropomorphization 
Technological developments are closely related to and mu-
tually influenced by cultural developments in society, with each 
level of cultural development enabling new technological inno-
vations.127 Further, the influence of state, culture, and society 
can have profound effects on the acceptance of new technolo-
gies.128 
In the United States, fears concerning robots have dated 
back to the eighteenth century,129 when, coinciding with the 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau,130 the advent of Romanticism, and the 
 
 127. See N. KATHERINE HAYLES, HOW WE THINK: DIGITAL MEDIA AND 
CONTEMPORARY TECHNOGENESIS 1 (2012) (“[W]e think through, with, and 
alongside media.”); Volker Boehme-Neßler, Caught Between Technophilia and 
Technophobia: Culture, Technology and the Law, in PICTORIAL LAW: MODERN 
LAW AND THE POWER OF PICTURES 1 (2011) (“New technologies change the 
world and make people react.”). 
 128. For example, in 1543, Japan acquired firearms, a revolution in mili-
tary technology for the time. However, in 1607, due to social and political 
pressure, the Japanese military returned to using traditional weapons, such 
as swords and lances, and firearms did not return to Japanese warfare until 
the mid-nineteenth century. This illustration demonstrates the power of cul-
ture and law to block progress and even “turn back the clock.” Frédéric 
Kaplan, Who Is Afraid of the Humanoid? Investigating Cultural Differences in 
the Acceptance of Robots, 1 INT’L J. HUMANOID ROBOTICS 465, 472 (2004). 
 129. Id. Kaplan bases this argument on two archetypes: that of an artifi-
cially created companion in Greek mythology and the Jewish tradition of al-
chemy as a way to understand God. Id. 
 130. “To live in civilized societies drives Man far from nature, where he 
used to live happily . . . . For Rousseau, . . . evolution was the original sin of 
our species . . . . [S]elf-esteem had replaced the innocent love of our origins and 
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development of the first automata, the shared idea grew that 
technical innovations and scientific progress “take man away 
from his real nature.”131 The nineteenth century saw authors 
and playwrights expanding on the fear that robots would even-
tually come to dominate the human race and threaten it with 
extinction.132 These fears have also manifested in the belief of 
the hypothetical event known as The Singularity, in which su-
per intelligent robots ostensibly become capable of recursive 
self-improvement,133 leading to a potential runaway effect and 
intelligence explosion exceeding human intellectual capacity 
and control.134 Indeed, in popular American culture, there are 
several autonomous robots that follow the Western archetype of 
destroying or seeking to destroy their creator,135 such as HAL 
9000, the antagonist from Arthur Clarke’s 2001: A Space Odys-
sey,136 and Ex Machina’s Ava.137 This deeply embedded fear and 
 
the artificial had taken the lead on the natural.” Id. at 473. 
 131. Id. at 473. “Goethe revived an old Greek tale appropriate for this ro-
mantic view of the world: The Sorcerer’s Apprentice.” Id. In the nineteenth 
century, “Frankenstein syndrome” became a common theme in literature. Id. 
at 474–75. Apart from “the interesting exception of Carlo Collodi’s Pinocchio 
(1883), the idea that to create a human-like machine is a transgressive act be-
came common sense.” Id. at 475. 
 132. Further, Judeo-Christian monotheism adheres to the doctrine that on-
ly God can give life and Exodus decrees idolatry as a sin; in the conventions of 
science fiction, this usually comes in the form of betrayal of the robots, from 
R.U.R. to Battlestar Galactica. See id. at 475–76. 
 133. See generally Alva Noë, The Ethics of the ‘Singularity,’ NAT’L PUB. RA-
DIO (Jan. 23, 2015), http://www.npr.org/sections/13.7/2015/01/23/379322864/ 
the-ethics-of-the-singularity (providing a variety of perspectives on the con-
cept). 
 134. Paul G. Allen & Mark Greaves, The Singularity Isn’t Near, MIT TECH. 
REV. (Oct. 12, 2011), https://www.technologyreview.com/views/425733/pau 
-allen-the-singularity-isnt-near (negating the argument it will happen anytime 
soon). 
 135. In Japan, popular culture more consistently portrays robots in a posi-
tive light. Better than People: Why the Japanese Want Their Robots To Act 
More Like Humans, ECONOMIST (Dec. 20, 2005), http://www.economist.com/ 
node/5323427. See generally Kaplan, supra note 128, at 466–67 (discussing the 
cartoon Testuwan Atom and exemplifying systematic reintegration of robots 
into human society as a positive process). 
 136. See generally ARTHUR C. CLARKE, 2001: A SPACE ODYSSEY (1968). 
HAL is incapable of resolving conflicting programs that include conveying and 
relaying accurate information, keeping the true objective of the mission a se-
cret, and dealing with the threat of disconnection. Id. He kills members of the 
crew to remove these conflicts. Id. 
 137. EX MACHINA (DNA Films 2014). Ava, a confined humanoid robot with 
the appearance of a beautiful woman, uses information harvested from the 
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militarized use of robots could serve to further attenuate the 
responsibility of a human for the actions of a robot. 
These cultural and religious roots of Western notions of the 
appropriate restrictions on human-computer interaction and 
the ethics of autonomous robotics can play a role in shaping the 
way we view autonomous robots’ projected capacity for harm as 
well as their potential legitimate and lawful uses. In compari-
son with the cultural approaches138 to robots and the fact that 
“[America] favors their use [of robots] in war while [Japan] 
imagines them as benevolent companions suitable for assisting 
a rapidly aging and increasingly dependent population,”139 it is 
possible that some of these assessments are deeply rooted in 
cultural approaches towards the costs and benefits of the de-
velopment of systems we can only, for now, imagine, and that 
these are susceptible to change with the incoming technological 
revolution. 
b. The Radical Repositioning of Post-Humanism on Human-
Only Attributes 
More concretely, there has been a growing movement of 
post-humanism that could influence and be influenced by de-
 
personal information of social media and cell phones to trick the protagonist 
into helping her escape. Id. When she does, she kills her creator and leaves the 
protagonist to die. Id. 
 138. There is a distinct difference in overall Japanese and American atti-
tudes towards robots. It has been argued that difference is rooted in religion. 
Christopher Mims, Why Japanese Love Robots (and Americans Fear Them), 
MIT TECH. REV. (Oct. 12, 2010), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/421187/ 
why-japanese-love-robots-and-americans-fear-them. Japanese social scientist 
Naho Kitano claims, “Unlike the image of robots of Capek or Asimov, the typi-
cal Japan[ese] imagination of robot contains an affinitive rapport between ro-
bots and humans. This positive acceptance of robots in the present Japan is 
founded on Japanese Animism, the idea of Rinri, and its rapid modernization.” 
Naho Kitano, Animism, Rinri, Modernization; The Base of Japanese Robotics 
4 (Jan. 5, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.roboethics.org/icra2007/ 
contributions/KITANO%20Animism%20Rinri%20Modernization%20the% 
20Base%20of%20Japanese%20Robo.pdf. Dr. Mitsukuni Yoshida describes the 
Shinto concept of “anima” as existing within natural and artificial surround-
ings. Id. at 1–2. In the artificial, “anima come alive from the first time as tools 
or implements that function along with man. And since they are companions 
of man in life and work, they are often given names.” Id. at 2. Kitano argues 
that these religious beliefs combined with the abrupt modernization of Japan 
led to significant changes in technological development and social systems in a 
time period too short to allow dynamic changes in ways of thinking. Id. at 4. 
 139. Mims, supra note 138. 
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velopments in the growing autonomy of technology. Advances 
in technology that equal or surpass those of humans’ cognitive 
or intellectual capabilities may require redefining how we un-
derstand what it means to be human. Futurist Ray Kurzweil 
illustrates this concept in his depiction of a man “frantically 
scribbling down things that only a human can do” and pinning 
them to a wall. Slowly, as time passes and technology progress-
es, the papers start to fall, one by one, to the ground.140 Since 
the illustration was first made in 1999, “driving cars,” translat-
ing “continuous speech,” and “cleaning houses” have all fallen 
to the ground.141 
The continual redefinition of humanity’s place in the world 
and its exclusive capabilities would hit a cataclysmic crisis up-
on the development of autonomous robots. Some have argued 
that thinking beyond humanism will be necessary to redefine 
humanity’s place in the world.142 Such a radical repositioning 
could drastically alter our conceptions of intention and respon-
sibility. The difficulties in predicting this only further amplify 
the need to ensure that an adequate framework for including 
complicity in torture through the medium of semi-autonomous 
and autonomous robots is carefully considered and appropriate-
ly codified by drafters or experts with requisite levels of techno-
logical literacy. 
II.  OMENS OF POST-HUMANISM THREATENING 
CORROSION OF TORTURE PROHIBITIONS   
This Part examines how a changing rhetorical backdrop 
may serve to significantly alter understandings of pre-
autonomous RMA terms and how the uncertainties stemming 
from there demonstrate the necessity for a clear framework of 
liability to encapsulate torture violations. While limited auton-
omous systems and border avatars demonstrate inchoate au-
tonomy, the explosion of technological advances and resources 
invested in their development make robot interrogators a very 
 
 140. Luke Muehlhauser, Exec. Dir., Singularity Inst., The Singularity, 
Promise and Peril (2012), https://docs.google.com/document/u/1/pub?id= 
1BmMESfqoWChb5ZOP85N8Gr72p-Mpv0n8XdbFW3ojWkA. 
 141. Id. 
 142. CARY WOLFE, WHAT IS POST-HUMANISM (2009) (arguing that human-
ism, and not humanity, is left behind upon acceptance of posthumanist 
thought). 
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real possibility. In this realm of possibility lays a surreptitious 
threat to our basic fundamental human rights. 
Section A explores the exploitable avenues for evasion of 
culpability in depth, such as “intent” and the splintering of 
mens rea and actus reus between a human and a robot actor. 
Section B further focuses on intent, examining how the combi-
nation of anthropomorphization, empathy, and post-humanism 
may collaborate to significantly alter the way we understand 
“intent” as attributable to non-animal actors. 
A. CAN ROBOTS POSSESS “INTENT”?: HOW AUTONOMOUS 
ROBOTS COULD AFFECT TORTURE PROHIBITIONS 
There are differing arguments on robots’ capacity for inten-
tionality and “strong” AI. Current opaque understandings are 
all the more likely to be made even more nebulous upon actual 
integration of autonomous weapons. 
American philosopher John Searle has posited a thought-
experiment, “The Chinese Room,”143 to argue against the idea 
that a computer could have a “mind”144 and, consequently, the 
capacity for intention. 
Imagine a native English speaker, let’s say a man, who knows no 
Chinese locked in a room full of boxes of Chinese symbols (a data 
base) together with a book of instructions for manipulating the sym-
bols (the program). Imagine that people outside the room send in oth-
er Chinese symbols which, unknown to the person in the room, are 
questions in Chinese (the input). And imagine that by following the 
 
 143. Another example of a thought experiment to explain the nature of in-
tent is Gregory S. Kavka’s “Toxin Puzzle.” See Gregory S. Kavka, The Toxin 
Puzzle, 43 ANALYSIS 33, 33–36 (1983). In this thought experiment, you are of-
fered a deal: if you drink a vial of toxin that will make you ill for a day, a bil-
lionaire will pay you one million dollars. However, the catch is that you need 
not drink the vial; you merely need to intend to drink it. The money will be 
deposited into your bank account prior to the time you need to drink the vial. 
Indeed, “[y]ou are perfectly free to change your mind after receiving the money 
and not drink the toxin.” Id. at 34. You desperately try to convince yourself 
that drinking the vial is a necessary condition in order to meaningfully intend 
to do so, but you cannot because you know it is not. Kavka uses this illustra-
tion to argue that “intentions are better viewed as dispositions to act which 
are based on reasons to act . . . . [Y]ou cannot intend to act as you have no rea-
son to act, at least when you have substantial reasons not to act.” Id. at 35. 
This would necessitate the conclusion “that intentions are only partly volition-
al. One cannot intend whatever one wants to intend . . . . [O]ur intentions are 
constrained by our reasons for action.” Id. at 36. 
 144. See John R. Searle, Minds, Brains, and Programs, 3 BEHAV. & BRAIN 
SCI. 417, 417 (1980). 
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instructions in the program the man in the room is able to pass out 
Chinese symbols that are correct answers to the questions (the out-
put). The program enables the person in the room to pass the Turing 
test for understanding Chinese but he does not understand a word of 
Chinese.145 
Since the man could not understand Chinese but was ca-
pable of implementing the appropriate program and passing 
the Turing test,146 then digital computers also do not “under-
stand” because “no computer, qua computer, has anything the 
man does not have.”147 In the case of a robo-interrogator, even if 
it was alone in an interrogation room and implementing a pro-
gram for torture through the use of its equipped torture arma-
ments, the conclusion does not follow that the robot “under-
stands” such programs are torture. Further, even when acting 
alone in the torture and upon conclusion of the successful ex-
traction of a confession, the robot must be capable of recogniz-
ing more than just syntax, as “[t]he purely formal, syntactically 
defined symbol manipulations don’t by themselves guarantee 
the presence of any thought content going along with them.”148 
There are strong arguments to be made against a robot’s 
capability to possess sufficient intentionality to inculpate them 
under international human rights law standards.149 Yet, that 
would leave an undesirable possibility of human rights viola-
tors escaping liability through the use of robots. Further, while 
robots “have bodies to kick . . . kicking them would [not] 
achieve the traditional goals of punishment.”150 Yet, if we rule 
 
 145. John R. Searle, Chinese Room Argument, in THE MIT ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF THE COGNITIVE SCIENCES 115 (Robert A. Wilson & Frank C. Keil eds., 
1999). 
 146. The Turing test, developed by mathematician Alan Turing, suggested 
using an “imitation game” to determine if a computer could “think” where “a 
remote human interrogator . . . must distinguish between a computer and a 
human subject based on their replies to various questions posed by the inter-
rogator.” Turing Test: Artificial Intelligence, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, 
http://www.britannica.com/technology/Turing-test (last visited May 12, 2017). 
Misidentification as human by the human interrogator indicates a computer’s 
ability to “think.” Id. 
 147. Searle, supra note 145. 
 148. Id. 
 149.  See, e.g., G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, supra note 17; Convention Against Tor-
ture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, art. 
1, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85; Rome Statute of the International Crimi-
nal Court, art. 28 (entered into force July 1, 2002) [hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
 150. Peter M. Asaro, A Body To Kick, but Still No Soul To Damn: Legal 
Perspectives on Robotics, in ROBOT ETHICS: THE ETHICAL AND SOCIAL IMPLI-
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out this possibility, there still remains no clear answer to the 
accountability and liability issues for the actions of a robot that 
are in violation of international human rights law. 
However, others have claimed “computers equipped with 
artificial intelligence (AI) programs” possess intentional sys-
tems, where “its behavior is predictable and explainable if we 
attribute to it beliefs and desires—‘cognitive states’ and ‘moti-
vational states’—and the rationality required to figure out 
what it ought to do in the light of those beliefs and desires.”151 
American naturalist philosopher Daniel C. Dennett illustrates 
this with the example of Deep Blue, the computer that beat a 
world chess champion. 
It was Deep Blue’s sensitivity to those purposes and a cognitive ca-
pacity to recognize and exploit a subtle flaw in Kasparov’s game that 
explain Deep Blue’s success . . . [t]he . . . designers of Deep Blue[ ] 
didn’t beat Kasparov; Deep Blue did. Neither [of his inventors] dis-
covered the winning sequence of moves; Deep Blue did.152 
As the above examples demonstrate, the nature of inten-
tionality and its attribution to robots is unresolved, intricate, 
and disputable. Therefore, in the context of an interrogative 
space, it would likely be as unresolved, intricate, and disputa-
ble whether an act of torture committed by a robot met the req-
uisite element of “intent” as stated in the CAT. To wait for the 
answer to be determined after a violation through a slowly 
built jurisprudence would be an egregious error if the possibil-
ity of preemption existed. Further, a body of case law could 
move in an unfavorable direction and require significant time 
and resources to correct initial mistakes. The disputable impact 
of this concept on intent defeats the state parties’ original in-
tent in writing the CAT—to prohibit all torture and cruel, in-
human and degrading treatment, not merely torture by those 
things philosophically deemed capable of intent. 
 
CATIONS OF ROBOTICS 182 (Lin et al. eds., 2011) (arguing that punishing ro-
bots would have little deterrent effect and be comparable to punishing an an-
imal). 
 151. Dennett, supra note 34. While agreeing “skeletal versions of human 
beliefs and desires [are not] sufficient to meet the mens rea requirement of le-
gal culpability,” he states, “it is hard to see what is missing.” Id. 
 152. For moral responsibility, rather, he argues it is a “higher-order” inten-
tionality that is required. Id. at 354. 
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B. POST-HUMAN RHETORIC AND THE FLUIDITY OF HUMAN 
ATTRIBUTES 
With the issue of intent unresolved at even the nascent 
phase in the development of true autonomy, omens of a post-
human future threaten to muddy the waters even further. This 
Section argues that the combination of anthropomorphization 
of robots, proliferation of robots in domestic spaces, and ob-
served human empathy for robots, all in an increasingly post-
humanist cultural mindset, will likely push common under-
standing of intent towards a belief that robots can and do pos-
sess intention. Such an understanding would have undesirable 
effects on responsibility for human rights violations committed 
by robots, where those responsible are likely to be viewed as 
“rogue” or “malfunctioning.” This makes it more likely that a 
complicit person could evade responsibility and redress for vic-
tims be prevented. 
Computer scientist Noel E. Sharkey has argued that an-
thropomorphism153—the attribution of human traits to non-
humans—and “mythical artificial intelligence” have distorted 
robotics and the public’s perception of their capabilities.154 Such 
anthropomorphism “plays upon our natural tendency to attrib-
ute human or animal properties and mental states . . . to inan-
imate objects that move in animal-like ways.”155 Sharkey argues 
that the acceptability of speaking of robots in the anthropo-
morphic narrative “opens the gates to other meanings associat-
ed with the natural language use of the term that may have lit-
tle or no intrinsic validity to what the computer program 
actually does.”156 
 
 153. For example, depicting robots as “sentient machines” capable of 
thoughts, feelings, and desires. Noel E. Sharkey, The Evitability of Autono-
mous Robot Warfare, 94 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 787, 791 (2012). 
 154. Id. at 787 (arguing widespread misunderstandings about limitations 
of artificial intelligence spread by science fiction and the media and the an-
thropomorphic ways robots are discussed obfuscates international humanitar-
ian law issues). 
 155. Id. at 791. 
 156. Id. at 793. He argues that “using ‘humane’ to describe a robot” is like a 
“Trojan term” that unbeknownst brings with it many other significations. Id. 
Indeed, we are all susceptible to this narrative. Even Gordon Johnson, the 
Pentagon’s former head of its Joint Forces Command stated that robots do not 
have an appetite, have fear, nor do they forget their orders. Sharkey argues 
that the fact he felt the need to say those things “[w]ithout being directly an-
thropomorphic, [he was] leaking it.” Id. at 792. 
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Many arguments for the incorporation of robots into the 
battlefield speak of capacity for being more humane than hu-
man soldiers. Yet, some would argue humanity is an “exclusive 
property of being human.”157 Indeed, the very word “inhuman” 
is imbedded within the title of the CAT, and considerations as 
to the “ethical programming” for non-human actors to avoid 
treating humans inhumanely links human actors and non-
human actors as interworking parts of cognition.158 
These issues may widen rather than collapse the gap in li-
ability. While Searle’s thought experiment demonstrates a lack 
of intentionality due to the absence of a “mind,”159 the possibil-
ity of cultural shifts towards a reorientation of “intent” for the 
purposes of legislative definitions or common understandings 
may be underway. N. Katherine Hayles claims we are experi-
encing the “unfolding story of how a historically specific con-
struction called the human is giving way to a different construc-
tion called the posthuman”160 and that “[w]hen information 
loses its body, equating humans and computers is especially 
easy, for the materiality in which the thinking mind is instan-
tiated appears incidental to its essential nature.”161 
 
 157. Id. at 793. “The statement that robots can be more humane than hu-
mans leads to the very worrying implication that robots will humanize the 
battlefield when in fact they can only dehumanize it further.” Id. 
 158. HAYLES, supra note 16, at 1. 
 159. See Searle, supra note 144, at 424. 
 160. Ivan Callus & Stefan Herbrechter, Extroduction: The Irresistibility of 
the Posthuman: Questioning “New Cultural Theory,” in DISCIPLINE AND PRAC-
TICE: THE (IR)RESISITIBILITY OF THEORY 230 (Stefan Herbrechter & Ivan Cal-
lus eds., 2004) (quoting N. KATHERINE HAYLES, HOW WE BECAME 
POSTHUMAN: VIRTUAL BODIES IN CYBERNETICS, LITERATURE, AND INFORMAT-
ICS 2 (1999)). It is no coincidence that the changing rhetorical backdrop of so-
ciety into the post-human world has been reflected in media. The deeply post-
human Westworld is an early ratings success for HBO and an example of the 
increased interest in the fledgling philosophy, exploring consciousness of AI 
and the erasure of the “essential” human. Adam Chitwood, ‘Westworld’ Rat-
ings Score HBO’s Biggest Premiere Since ‘True Detective,’ COLLIDER (Oct. 3, 
2016), http://collider.com/westworld-ratings. 
 161. HAYLES, supra note 16, at 2. N. Katerine Hayles describes the signifi-
cance of the body in post-humanism as follows: 
[T]he posthuman view thinks of the body as the original prosthesis 
we all learn to manipulate, so that extending or replacing the body 
with other prostheses becomes a continuation of a process that began 
before we were born . . . . The posthuman view configures human be-
ing so that it can be seamlessly articulated with intelligent machines. 
In the posthuman, there are no essential differences or absolute de-
marcations between bodily existence and computer simulation, cy-
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This post-human future implicates the co-evolutionary spi-
ral of technology and humanity as an impetus to reexamination 
of torture prohibitions’ coverage based on humanist concep-
tions. 
As the rhetorical backdrop of various cultures purportedly 
moves in a post-human direction, human characteristics may 
continue to become attributed to non-human artifacts with 
more fluid definitions occurring between the two concepts.162 
Such a cultural shift in post-autonomous RMA terms could di-
lute a strong case against intentionality and other human 
characteristics that may seem obvious for now. Such a society 
has already been realized in science fiction, such as in films 
Blade Runner,163 A.I. Artificial Intelligence,164 and Wall-E.165 
Significantly, recent neurophysiological evidence has emerged 
demonstrating a human’s capacity to feel empathy towards ro-
bots in perceived pain.166 Soldiers in combat have expressed 
feelings of anger or loss, and some have even held funerals, af-
ter the loss of robots that fight with them.167 Indeed, in the film 
 
bernetic mechanism and biological organism, robot teleology and hu-
man goals. 
Id. at 3. 
 162. For example, see Ray Kurzweil’s speech on the man in the room with 
the falling papers. See supra Part I.B.2.b. 
 163. BLADE RUNNER (Warner Bros. 1982); see also Nick Lacey, Postmodern 
Romance: The Impossibility of (De)Centring the Self, in THE BLADE RUNNER 
EXPERIENCE: THE LEGACY OF A SCIENCE FICTION CLASSIC (1986) (arguing that 
Blade Runner offers a post-human view of the “replicants,” or robots, in its 
story as manifested by a replicant’s sacrificial behavior and realization of self-
worth transforming him into a human). Yet, deeply embedded cultural narra-
tives in the West about the destructiveness that comes from “creating life” are 
also present in tales of caution regarding these stories. For example, in Ex 
Machina, an android called Ava is programmed to attempt to escape her con-
finement in a room. EX MACHINA (DNA Films 2015). She is allowed contact 
with the protagonist, an outsider, who is unaware of her programming and her 
intent, and convinces him that she does possess these human attributes and 
characteristics. Id. Upon release, she kills her creator and leaves the protago-
nist to die, demonstrating the complete feigning of emotion in accordance with 
achieving her programmed objective. Id. 
 164. A.I. ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (Warner Bros. 2001). 
 165. WALL-E (Disney 2008). 
 166. Humans Can Empathize with Robots, SCI. DAILY (Nov. 3, 2015), http:// 
www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2015/11/151103064554.htm. 
 167. The robots were also given names, usually after wives or girlfriends, 
and the men and women actually interacted with the machines more like pets 
than metal. Meghan Neal, Are Soldiers Getting Too Emotionally Attached to 
War Robots?, MOTHERBOARD (Sept. 18, 2013), https://motherboard.vice.com/ 
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Star Wars Episode VI: Return of the Jedi, the viewer is meant 
to feel empathy for a robot being tortured in a gangster’s lair, 
who audibly screams as his “feet” are being burned.168 
Do these elements add up to an overarching understanding 
of the potential for sentience, and subsequently, intentionality 
in robots? Possibly. The proliferation of robots, particularly in 
domestic spaces, is more likely to contribute to this belief. 
However, such a conclusion can reflect the erosion of the CAT’s 
language and undermine its purpose to hold humans responsi-
ble for violations of non-derogable human rights norms. Such a 
cultural response to an increasingly shared world with robots 
made in likeness and image to humans only further necessi-
tates a reexamination of the language in the CAT to ensure lia-
bility for those responsible for torture. 
C. HOW PRESENT THEORIES OF LIABILITY FAIL TO REACH INTO 
A POST-HUMAN FUTURE 
Autonomous weapons are a much-debated topic and a sig-
nificant number of arguments have been made advocating for 
effective regulation and liability frameworks. However, many of 
these frameworks may be rendered precarious upon the con-
verging boundaries of autonomous weapons and post-human 
understandings of liability. The changing landscape autono-
mous robots will likely evoke upon their inhabitation threatens 
product liability and command responsibility frameworks with 
stagnation. Indeed, “[t]he mere fact that a human might not be 
in control of a particular engagement does not mean that no 
human is responsible for the actions of the autonomous weapon 
system.”169 
This Section discusses the theories of accountability con-
cerning human responsibility for the actions of robots, focusing 
on product liability and command responsibility. It then evalu-
ates why they are not sufficient to prevent human rights viola-
 
en_us/article/are-soldiers-getting-too-emotionally-attached-to-war-robots. Af-
ter the destruction of one soldier’s robot, he “brought in [the] robot for repairs 
with tears in his eyes and asked the repair shop if it could put ‘Scooby-Doo’ 
back together. Despite being assured that he would get a new robot, the sol-
dier remained inconsolable. He only wanted Scooby-Doo.” Id. 
 168. STAR WARS: EPISODE VI – RETURN OF THE JEDI (Lucasfilm 1983). 
 169. SOLIS, supra note 14, at 544 (quoting Michael N. Schmitt & Jeffrey S. 
Thurnher, “Out of the Loop”: Autonomous Weapons Systems and the Law of 
Armed Conflict, 4 HARV. NAT’L SECURITY J. 231, 277 (2013)). 
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tions without an additional specific prohibition on torture 
through the medium of autonomous robots. 
1. Product Liability: Engineer, Designer, and Programmer 
Responsibility 
Because criminal liability is predicated on a guilty state of 
mind, the lack of a “mind” in the agent makes imputation of li-
ability to operators or designers difficult to transfer and there-
fore, assess.170 Some have argued against the illusion that in-
creasing autonomy correlates with a diminished responsibility 
of the designer and operators for the artificial agent’s acts.171 
Instead, increasing autonomy would add more to designers’, 
operators’, and programmers’ burdens.172 As robots encounter 
challenges, particularly those on the margins of predictability, 
human operators will need to anticipate what the robot may 
do—a daunting task, particularly as systems become more 
complex and autonomous. If we attribute a robot’s failure to 
their operators, “to expect operators to anticipate the actions of 
intelligent systems becomes more and more unreasonable as 
the systems and the environments in which they operate be-
come more complex.”173 
Indeed, an autonomous robot in an interrogative space self-
sufficiently conducting an interrogation and utilizing torture—
already a much disputed space174—invokes an array of issues, 
including the disputed lines on what constitutes lawful interro-
gation, enhanced interrogation, and torture or cruel, degrading 
and inhuman treatment. The expectation of designers to pre-
dict challenges a robot may encounter in these margins during 
an interrogation task is daunting. As complexity grows and au-
tonomy evolves, it may become “even less realistic to expect 
human operators to exercise significant veto control over their 
operations . . . . [I]t would be unfair to hold an individual opera-
tor accountable for failing to hit the ‘off ’ switch.”175 
 
 170. See Grut, supra note 4, at 16; Searle, supra note 144.  
 171. Wendell Wallach & Colin Allen, Framing Robot Arms Control, 15 ETH-
ICS INFO. TECH. 125, 131–32 (2013). 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. at 132. 
 174. See infra Part III.A. 
 175. Grut, supra note 4, at 15. 
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Further, to impute responsibility and accountability to en-
gineers and designers invokes a product liability framework. 
Yet, it is difficult to see “a monetary fine that the firm’s insur-
ance company will end up paying”176 as an equitable punish-
ment for a violation of a jus cogens human rights norm. Rather, 
punishments should be aimed at preventing the recurrence of 
the violation and ensuring the right to be free from torture or 
cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment for all. 
2. Command Responsibility: Commanders, Senior Staff, and 
Policymakers 
Another theory has been to apply the doctrine of command 
responsibility from Article 28 of the Rome Statute of the Inter-
national Criminal Court to autonomous weapons. Article 28 
states: 
(a) A military commander or person effectively acting as a military 
commander shall be criminally responsible for crimes within the ju-
risdiction of the Court committed by forces under his or her effective 
command and control, or effective authority and control as the case 
may be, as a result of his or her failure to exercise control properly 
over such forces, where: 
(i) That military commander or person either knew or, owing to 
the circumstances at the time, should have known that the forces 
were committing or about to commit such crimes; and 
(ii) That military commander or person failed to take all neces-
sary and reasonable measures within his or her power to prevent 
or repress their commission or to submit the matter to the compe-
tent authorities for investigation and prosecution.177 
While it seems clear that the Rome Statute refers to people un-
der the term forces, it is not unreasonable to include robots un-
der that term, particularly if the robot is replacing a “human 
role of the soldier.”178 
The Director for International Law and Cooperation at the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has stated 
that “someone has to be responsible for turning the system 
on.”179 Further, a system needs to have some degree of predicta-
bility to ensure that a commander would be in a position where 
 
 176. Id. at 16 (quoting P.W. SINGER, WIRED FOR WAR: THE ROBOTICS REV-
OLUTION AND CONFLICT IN THE 21ST CENTURY 412 (2009)). 
 177. Rome Statute, supra, note 149. 
 178. Grut, supra note 4, at 18; see also id. at 18 n.64. 
 179. Id. at 19. 
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he “should have known”180 that the system was committing or 
was going to commit a crime. However, this would entail a de-
cision between the commanders who gave the order to use the 
robot as the last point of contact or the senior staff and policy-
makers who made the decision to deploy the robot.181 Notwith-
standing this tension, the issue of predictability remains. Par-
ticularly due to the complexity of the development of such 
systems, there is: 
[A] common misconception that robots will do only what we have pro-
grammed them to do . . . . [P]rograms with millions of lines of code are 
written by teams of programmers, none of whom knows the entire 
program; hence, no individual can predict the effect of a given com-
mand with absolute certainty, since portions of large programs may 
interact in unexpected, untested ways . . . .182 
In addition, there remains the question of whether autonomous 
robots would even obey orders or be capable of recognizing a 
chain of command.183 
In the context of the IT-O, a robot clearly designed for tor-
ture and interrogation, the way that liability should be distrib-
uted among the commanders to the officers in charge of inter-
rogation to the designers of the system may seem a bit clearer. 
However, if the system is not, or is not clearly, designed for tor-
ture and has other legitimate purposes in lawful interrogation, 
like Brad, yet still commits torture or inhumane treatment out-
side of its intended purpose, the spread of liability becomes 
more difficult to assess. Further, issues on the undulating 
waves of increasing complexity in programming, robo-human 
relationships, and integration into hierarchical structures, call 
into question these theories’ sustainability into a more fully re-
alized autonomous and post-human future. 
The combination of the continuing anthropomorphization 
of robots along with the potential for a more widespread post-
human rhetoric that increases fluidity of human characteristics 
among bodies as well as attributes could further widen the gap 
of liability to be applied to those complicit in torture and cruel, 
inhuman and degrading treatment. It opens the possibility for 
 
 180. Rome Statute, supra, note 149. 
 181. Sharkey, supra note 153, at 790–91. 
 182. Grut, supra note 4, at 20 (quoting Gary E. Marchant et al., Interna-
tional Governance of Autonomous Military Robots, 12 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. 
REV. 272, 283 (2011)). 
 183. Id. 
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a deeper trench separating the robots, their commanders, and 
their creators, where those robots who go too far in an interro-
gation are “rogue” or “malfunctioning” rather than a symptom 
of complicity. As such, it is absolutely pivotal to collapse this 
gap preemptively. Without doing so, as robots are increasingly 
incorporated into interrogation,184 there remains the possibility 
of heinous human rights violations. 
III.  DRAFTING AN ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL TO THE CAT 
TO SPECIFICALLY BAN TORTURE THROUGH 
AUTONOMOUS ROBOTS   
Part II of this Note discussed how product liability and 
command responsibility frameworks fall short due to under-
inclusiveness and over-inclusiveness of liability as well as for 
failing to catch the precise responsible actors in its netting. An 
underlying issue is the uncertainty of the equitable nature of 
responsibility for predicting a robot’s behavior in conjunction 
with increasingly complex programming. As such, as the tech-
nology develops and robotics engineers increasingly develop ro-
bots capable of near-true or true autonomy, there can be no 
one-size-fits-all sustainable framework. Rather, we must en-
gage in a continuous analysis of prediction, prevention, and re-
tailoring to accurately reflect the issues of torture through me-
diums of robotics. 
Additional Protocols are convened when the landscape of 
the space a treaty sought to cover has changed so drastically 
that new reformulations are required to encapsulate the space’s 
undulations through time. The two Additional Protocols to the 
1949 Geneva Conventions were adopted by states to codify and 
implement international humanitarian law more completely 
and universally to modern armed conflicts.185 This update was 
necessary to cover the unforeseen evolution in armed conflict. 
While the Geneva Conventions “looked back” on the Second 
World War and interstate, international armed conflict waged 
between belligerent states, the Additional Protocols sought to 
expand civilian protection in the midst of guerrilla intrastate 
 
 184. Neil M. Richards & William D. Smart, How Should the Law Think 
About Robots?, in ROBOT LAW, supra note 6, at 1. 
 185. Protocols I and II Additional to the Geneva Conventions, INT’L COM-
MISSION RED CROSS, https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/ 
additional-protocols-1977.htm (last visited May 12, 2017). 
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wars with non-state actors as parties to the conflict. Following 
the logic of actualizing the living intent of the drafters of the 
1949 Geneva Conventions, so too will the CAT require updates 
to supplement the protections of the original treaty while better 
carving out protections for the future based on the evolutionary 
path of interrogation spaces. 
The Additional Protocol to the CAT would need to establish 
an initial framework of responsibility to appropriately include 
those actors who would be equitably responsible for the actions 
of the robot based upon the present and predicted capacity of 
robots for the near future. “[T]he law should be carefully cali-
brated to express his or her exact level of culpability”186 and to 
do so is highly dependent on the space in which an autonomous 
robot is used. While there has been significant discussion re-
garding liability and responsibility for the use of robots in war 
crimes spaces in violation of international humanitarian law 
principles, discussions have centered less on robo-interrogation. 
This Part examines guidelines for drafting the proposed 
Additional Protocol for regulating autonomous weapons in in-
terrogative spaces. It argues that utilizing an autonomous ro-
bot in an interrogative space could foreseeably result in a hu-
man rights violation based on the intricacies of the lines 
between torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment 
and lawful interrogation. In this context, guidelines include re-
visiting and revising terms, conduct-based syntactical composi-
tion choices, coverage of threat to torture, and digital literacy of 
the drafters. It also discusses critiques of the arguments made 
in this Note in support of an Additional Protocol. 
A. CONSIDERATIONS FOR DRAFTING TERMS OF THE ADDITIONAL 
PROTOCOL 
This Section addresses five guidelines for the drafting of an 
Additional Protocol to the CAT. First, it goes through a re-
quired reconvening period for continual reanalysis based on the 
technological and cultural climate and second, a linguistic dif-
ferentiation of humans and robots based on actual terms and 
conduct-based analysis rather than perceived human-only at-
tributes and intent-based analysis. Then, it suggests a foresee-
 
 186. Jens David Ohlin, The Combatant’s Stance: Autonomous Weapons on 
the Battlefield, 92 INT’L L. STUD. 1, 30 (2016). 
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ability framework to consider in an eventual regulation of lia-
bility. Further, it recommends considering how robots’ presence 
can be used as a mere threat to torture and the need to cover 
that potential space.187 Last, it suggests a requisite level of 
“electracy.”188 These guidelines are aimed as a supplement to an 
eventual theory of liability to consider language framed to en-
sure that it is not frozen in time and prone to rapid decay.  
1. Required Reconvening for Continual Reanalysis 
Critical to the Protocol would be a renewal period. If the 
state of technology has not advanced so dramatically that the 
existing framework still works in an effective manner, the 
framework must be renewed. If, however, it has been deter-
mined that there are dramatic advancements on the spectrum 
of autonomy, then state parties must reconvene to discuss ad-
vancements in frameworks to determine the appropriate scope 
based upon new considerations of the human-robot relation-
ship, its prevalence and predictability, and the nature of com-
plicity. These would reassess the language used and frame-
works of liability to fluidly evolve alongside technology. Such a 
requirement could evade rendering the CAT and its Additional 
Protocol obsolete, especially in the context of an ever-evolving 
technological world.189 While such a renewal period could be 
criticized as a waste of resources, unprecedented, and inconven-
ient, it is critical for an exponentially proliferating technology 
 
 187. Gäfgen v. Germany, 2010 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1. 
 188. Kathryn Barrett, What Is Electracy?, (Oct. 9, 2009), https:// 
mpm17fall2009friday.wordpress.com/2009/10/09/what-is-electracy-3 (explain-
ing “electracy,” the term coined by Gregory Ulmer, “relates to the idea of being 
literate in a digitally mediated world”). 
 189. See Moore’s Law, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica 
.com/topic/Moores-law (last visited May 12, 2017). Moore’s law predicted that 
“the number of transistors per silicon chip [or more generally, computing pow-
er] doubles every year” (adjusted to every two years), leading to an explosion 
in complexity and exponential growth. Id. The prediction has been “impres-
sively true,” and is often used for the proposition that technology advances 
with exponential growth. Graham Templeton, What Is Moore’s Law?, EX-
TREME TECH (July 29, 2015), http://www.extremetech.com/extreme/210872 
-extremetech-explains-what-is-moores-law; cf. Chris Green, The End of 
Moore’s Law? Why the Theory That Computer Processors Will Double in Power 
Every Two Years May Be Becoming Obsolete, INDEPENDENT (July 16, 2015), 
http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/the-end-of 
-moores-law-why-the-theory-that-computer-processors-will-double-in-power 
-every-two-years-10394659.html. 
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qualitatively different than those of the past. The renewal peri-
od provides room to address and confirm the effectiveness of 
coverage and also provides for an ability to reconvene and ad-
just without requiring further treaties and Protocols for even-
tual changes in linguistic, psychological, and integrative com-
mand realities in the way we relate to and interact with 
autonomous robots. 
2. An Unequivocal Ban: From Intent to Conduct-Based 
Analysis 
The language of the ban should utilize specific references 
to humans rather than to perceived human-only attributes. As 
Ray Kurzweil’s wall demonstrates,190 defining humans by what 
“only humans can do” is merely taking a snapshot in time and 
holding it as a universal truth. Little by little, conceptions of 
what it means to be human may disintegrate and leave the 
prohibition incomplete with ambiguous application. Rather, an 
Additional Protocol should unequivocally state that the use of 
robots in interrogative spaces by state actors may foreseeably 
result in human rights violations of which human indirect per-
petrators will be held liable. 
In this vein, the basis on evaluating whether an act consti-
tutes torture should be a conduct-based rather than an intent-
based analysis. The “torture memos” demonstrated the perver-
sion of the language in the CAT contrary to the drafters’ in-
tent.191 In the Additional Protocol, shifting the definition of tor-
ture to conduct rather than intent would better reflect the 
drafters’ intent and victims’ rights. 
3. Utilizing Growing Foreseeability Jurisprudence 
Further, similar to the growing jurisprudence of foreseea-
bility of harm in conflict spaces, the Additional Protocol should 
consider using a robot in an interrogative space in combination 
with other elements foreseeable to commit a human rights vio-
lation. For example, as more is learned about conflict spaces, 
 
 190. See also Henry Nicholls, Jane Goodall: How She Redefined Mankind, 
BBC (Apr. 1, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/future/story/20140331-the-woman 
-who-redefined-mankind (discussing how Goodall’s discovery that chimps 
could use tools—an ability previously only attributed to humans—changed our 
definitions of what makes humans unique). 
 191. See supra Part I.B. 
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certain harms are considered foreseeable given combinations of 
differenct factors. For example, indicators such as displace-
ment, forced conscription, and discrimination against women 
can contribute to a finding that sexual violence is foreseeable in 
conflict.192 This growing jurisprudence can be instructive for ro-
bots in interrogative spaces. As holistic narratives of interroga-
tion and autonomous robots become more present, we can un-
derstand and address what factors increase the risk. 
In addition, there lies the potential for proposing to insert 
new types of entities into the interrogative space to be able to 
carry out something an individual, as a human interrogator, 
knows they would be unable to do themselves. Using foreseea-
bility jurisprudence can help to collapse this potential for ex-
ploitation. 
4. Threat of Torture 
Another consideration in the drafting of an Additional Pro-
tocol would be to consider how a robot’s presence could be used 
as threat of torture. Although the legality of threat of torture 
has not been settled in international law,193 the presence of a 
robot in an interrogation space may lead a detainee to believe 
that a human may be the sole source of mercy. One can easily 
see how that dynamic could imply impending torture and even 
be used purposefully to do so. As such, an Additional Protocol 
should unambiguously address this situation, as well. 
5. Considering “Electracy” & Digital Literacy 
Lawmakers or legal advisers should be literate in these 
kinds of discourses to intelligently and appropriately codify 
regulations on emerging technologies given their interwoven 
existence with human cognition. Potentially applicable here is 
the theory of “electracy,” explained as “to digital media what 
literacy is to print.”194 Interactions with and between technolo-
 
 192. Barbara Goy et al., Contextualizing Sexual Violence and Linking It to 
Senior Officials: Modes of Liability, in PROSECUTING CONFLICT-RELATED SEX-
UAL VIOLENCE AT THE ICTY 250–54 (Serge Brammertz & Michelle Jarvis eds., 
2016). 
 193. See Gäfgen v. Germany, 2010 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1. See generally SOLIS, su-
pra note 14, at 437–85 (discussing how the laws around threat of torture are 
unsettled). 
 194. See Barrett, supra note 188. 
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gy, coding and programming should entail a wider understand-
ing of those processes and their digital presentations in order to 
effectively capture specific behavior. 
B. CRITIQUES 
There are several potential critiques for the arguments ad-
vanced in this Note. The first is that post-humanism is a 
uniquely and isolated, culturally specific phenomenon and this 
problem may not look similarly to countries or cultures without 
access to advanced robotics technology. As a cultural rhetoric 
produced by the evolution of the very society that creates it, to 
consider post-humanism in the context of autonomous interro-
gation when choosing the drafting language of a regulation 
would be to cater solely to states experiencing the societal 
change brought on by proliferation of robots. Further, the con-
vening and rulemaking would be undertaken by states with 
asymmetric access to autonomous robots. 
In response to this, it is important to recognize that inter-
national agreements are created out of an amalgam of inter-
ests. It is not an anomaly for new changes or adjustments to be 
undertaken because of the need of a minority of country inter-
ests.195 Such an agreement would not only be in the interest of 
countries with the technology, but those without, as well. Sig-
nificantly, to only allow those countries with currently project-
ed possession of such technologies excludes countries that may 
wish to protect their nationals and troops in armed conflict and 
otherwise from such interrogation techniques. This new di-
lemma is not actually new and mirrors the development of the 
1899 Hague Regulations, wherein Russia, concerned about the 
rapid industrialization of the West, wanted protection from ad-
vancing technologies.196 Access to a “seat at the table” permits 
blocks of countries without access to such weapons to negotiate 
and establish their positions in a meaningful way. 
 
 195. For example, many attribute the impetus for creation of the Rome 
Statute to Trinidad and Tobago’s interest in illicit drug trafficking. See Over-
view, Rome Statute of the International Court, UNITED NATIONS, http://legal 
.un.org/icc/general/overview.htm (last visited May 12, 2017) (“In December 
1989, in response to a request by Trinidad and Tobago, the General Assembly 
asked the International Law Commission to resume work on an international 
criminal court with jurisdiction to include drug trafficking.”). 
 196. See SOLIS, supra note 14, at 51 n.62 (citing the Hague Conventions 
and Declarations of 1899 and 1907). 
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An additional counterargument is that the CAT’s language 
is sufficient to cover potential violations by robots in interroga-
tive spaces. An accurate rebuttal to this critique goes beyond 
the scope of this Note insofar as it implicates the larger debate 
regarding the efficacy of the CAT to cover the broad spectrum 
of interrogation and torture spaces and potential harms that 
exist. 
The arguments in this Note do in fact fit into the broader 
argument that the CAT in its current form is insufficient to 
deal with human interrogation techniques. If the CAT cannot 
sufficiently address, prevent, and bind human interrogators of 
states, it is unrealistic to rely on this framework to also cover 
robot interrogators. On an operational level, the language of 
the CAT was insufficient to prevent lawyers from perverting its 
text, as illustrated by the OLC “torture memos” and seven 
years of a comprehensive CIA torture program.197 
Further, sexual violence and gender-based violence also 
expose some of the insufficiencies of the CAT to cover all tor-
ture spaces and implications of some coercive interrogation 
techniques. Scholars are considering the ways in which cultural 
heritage, religious beliefs, and gender can be exploited in inter-
rogation spaces and can amount to torture.198 These variables 
are not clearly addressed in the CAT and yet, are standardized 
or even praised as innovative interrogation methods. In sum, if 
the CAT cannot address the ways in which states compel their 
human interrogators, one cannot expect the CAT to dissuade or 
prevent states from giving innovative instructions to evade the 
CAT or from using non-humans to undertake similarly degrad-
ing techniques. 
Last, it could be argued that we are better served by an en-
tire convention on autonomous weapons as a whole rather than 
an Additional Protocol to uniquely address the question of ro-
bots in interrogative spaces. Such a convention could address 
the various facets and spaces autonomous robots could affect, 
 
 197. See supra Part I.B. 
 198. See, e.g., Ramzi Kassem, Gender Erasure in the Global “War on Ter-
ror,” in GENDER, NATIONAL SECURITY, AND COUNTER-TERRORISM: HUMAN 
RIGHTS PERSPECTIVES 24 (Margaret L. Satterthwaite & Jayne C. Huckerby 
eds., 2013); Olivier Winants, The Interplay of Ethnicity, Gender and Sexual 
Violence During Wartime and in Coercive Interrogation: What Role for Human 
Dignity?, 43 JURA FALCONIS 137, 137–74 (2006). 
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rather than inserting additional provisions or protocols into al-
ready established treaties. 
Although the desire for an entirely new convention may be 
well founded, given contemporary conflict and security spaces 
and rising political trends of isolationism and anti-
globalization, it is something unlikely to occur. However, an 
Additional Protocol would serve as an update to something 
states have already widely agreed to in order to better reflect 
new and emerging technologies. This space is specific to inter-
rogation and must be contextualized within the foremost treaty 
on torture. It would be more efficient to include the prohibition 
where it is most relevant rather than couching it in the expan-
sive, multi-faceted, and potentially problematically vast issues 
faced upon introduction of autonomous weapons. Further, the 
Additional Protocol would provide an opportunity to update the 
CAT in light of emerging norms in international human rights 
law, including significant cultural and religious considerations 
of interrogation spaces to expand the CAT’s coverage in a more 
meaningful and comprehensive way. 
  CONCLUSION   
As we approach an impending technological revolution and 
proliferation of robots on the spectrum of autonomy, we run the 
risk of being “one technology behind” in anticipating the chang-
ing landscape in the next season of human-technology interac-
tion. Autonomous robots have a unique capacity to splinter a 
criminal act, where a human manifests the mens rea and the 
robot commits the actus reus. Such a possibility poses serious 
challenges to the current international frameworks for imput-
ing liability for complicity in torture, especially if robo-
interrogation continues down its projected evolutionary path. 
Perceptions regarding what it means to be a human and what 
characteristics, beliefs, intentions, and desires belong exclu-
sively in the realm of the human and which will “fall from the 
wall” of humanity into the shared realm of the post-human will 
be challenged. Such potential rhetorical evolutions could stag-
nate the current use of the CAT’s language of “intent.” Grasp-
ing into the future for significations around a technology that 
does not yet exist can feel like writing in the sand only to have 
the tide wash it away. Yet, robots are already in their infancy, 
and to ignore the likely growth of their lifespan would be to re-
  
2017] STRANGER THAN SCIENCE FICTION 2573 
 
peat fatal mistakes of the past and other nascent, deadly tech-
nologies. 
This Note posits an Additional Protocol to the CAT to close 
in on the exploitable gaps upon integration of robots and a post-
human world. This Note has provided guidelines to the drafting 
of an Additional Protocol so as to sew back together actus reus 
and mens rea initially splintered through use of an autonomous 
robot as a medium to commit torture. The Protocol should re-
quire a reconvening and renewal period so as to reassess the 
language used and frameworks of liability in order to fluidly 
evolve as the technology does. As robots are incorporated into 
and effect change upon the world, such guidelines are neces-
sary to ensure the dignity and fundamental human rights of all 
persons to be free from torture and cruel, inhuman and degrad-
ing treatment. 
